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Since the 1970s, antidiscrimination advocates have approached
Title VII as though the impact of the law on minorities and women could be
considered in isolation. This Article argues that this is a mistake. Instead,
Gender and the Tournament attempts to reclaim Title VII’s original
approach, which justified efforts to dismantle segregated workplaces as
necessary to both eliminate discrimination and promote economic growth.
Using that approach, this Article is the first to consider how widespread
corporate tournaments and growing gender disparities in the upper echelons
of the economy are intrinsically intertwined, and how they undermine the
core promises of antidiscrimination law. The Article draws on a case filed in
2014 challenging the “rank-and-yank” evaluation system at Microsoft, as
well as social science literature regarding narcissism and stereotype
expectations, to illustrate how consideration of the legitimacy of competitive
pay for performance schemes is essential to combating the intrinsically
gendered nature of advancement in the new economy.
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Introduction
Ellen Pao galvanized attention to the plight of women in the financial
world by suing Kleiner Perkins, Silicon Valley’s storied venture capital firm,
for sex discrimination. Only 6% of venture capital partners are women, 1 and
Perkins enticed Pao to the firm with promises of advancement. Yet, after
seven years in her job, she found the promises hollow. She alleged that men
were promoted ahead of women, that the firm embraced men’s business
promotion more readily than women’s, and that it provided little support for
women who experienced sexual harassment, a not uncommon occurrence in
the financial world. Pao charged that Kleiner Perkins was a “boys’ club,”
with gender-coded evaluations and different standards of advancement for
men and women.2 While the firm claimed to prize initiative and drive, Pao’s

1. Davey Alba, Ellen Pao Ends Her Lawsuit Against Kleiner Perkins, WIRED BUS. (Sept. 10,
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/09/ellen-pao-ends-lawsuit-kleiner-perkins/ [https://perma.cc/
Z9AZ-43PS]. And that number represents a drop from 10% in 1999 to 6% in 2015. CANDIDA G.
BRUSH ET AL., WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS 2014: BRIDGING THE GENDER GAP IN VENTURE
CAPITAL—EXECUTIVE S UMMARY 11 (2014).
2. Ruth Reader, Ellen Pao’s Lawyer Concludes: Kleiner Perkins Is a Boys’ Club, VENTURE
BEAT (Mar. 24, 2015), http://venturebaeat.com/2015/03/24/ellen-paos-lawyer-concludes-kleinerperkins-is-a-boys-club/ [https://perma.cc/MP62-5T9S].
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performance reviews dinged her for being “sharp elbowed,”3 a trait rarely
criticized among the men. Following a five-week trial in 2015, she lost.4
In September 2014, Katherine Moussouris and two other women filed a
class action lawsuit against Microsoft.5 They claimed that Microsoft’s “stack
ranking” system, which graded technical and engineering employees on a
forced curve, discriminated against women. The system identifies a top group
in line to receive bigger bonuses and promotion opportunities, a middle group
of adequate employees, and a bottom group that the company encouraged to
leave. The ranking system created internal competition that supposedly
aligned employee objectives with the company mission, but it has also been
the subject of a withering management analysis that found the system
destructive. Although Microsoft abandoned the system after Moussouris filed
the class action, a large number of Fortune 500 companies use similar ranking
systems.6 And the action against Microsoft has involved multi-year
litigation.7
***
Two literatures increasingly take aim at the worlds of Ellen Pao and
Katherine Moussouris—and the workplaces that have contributed the most
to increasing gender inequality. The first involves macro-level challenges to
practices in the new economy, such as the corporate “tournament,” 8 that
valorizes intense competition either as an end in itself or as an aid to the
pursuit of reductionist, short-term objectives. While many continue to defend
3. Patrick Kulp, 5 Things We Learned About Silicon Valley Culture from the Ellen Pao Trial,
MASHABLE
(Mar.
29,
2015),
http://mashable.com/2015/03/29/ellen-pao-trial-recap/
#obaH6S8iSkq5 [perma.cc/5W5F-N9VJ].
4. Pao v. Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Byers LLC, No. CGC-12-520719, 2015 WL 1726539, at
*4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2015). See generally ELLEN K. PAO, RESET: MY F IGHT FOR INCLUSION
AND C HANGE (2017) (discussing Pao’s experience at Kleiner Perkins).
5. Class Action Complaint, Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No. C15-1483JLR, 2015 WL
5460411 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2016).
6. Jeanne Sahadi, Amazon Workplace Story Raises Dread of ‘Rank and Yank’ Reviews, CNN
MONEY (Aug. 17, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/17/news/amazon-performance-review/
[https://perma.cc/AMU3-3P4B].
7. Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No. C15-1483JLR, 2016 WL 4472930, at *13 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 14, 2016) (granting in part and denying in part Microsoft’s motion to dismiss, strike, and for a
more definite statement). On May 2, 2017, the court appointed a Special Master to make discovery
recommendations. Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No. C15-1483JLR, 2017 WL 1652910 (W.D.
Wash. May 2, 2017).
8. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002):
These executives are hyper-motivated survivors of a highly competitive
tournament . . . who have proven their ability to make money while putting on a veneer
of loyalty to the firm. At least some of the new breed appear to be Machiavellian,
narcissistic, prevaricating, pathologically optimistic, free from self-doubt and moral
distractions, willing to take great risk as the company moves up and to lie when things
turn bad, and nurtured by a corporate culture that instills loyalty to insiders, obsession
with short-term stock price, and intense distrust of outsiders.
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the system9 as necessary to create more dynamic corporate environments in
a rapidly changing world of technological change and globalization, an
increasing number of scholars maintain that the new system has not
outperformed the earlier managerial model 10 and has arguably contributed
both to a decline in productivity growth and to greater societal inequality. 11
More critically, a growing chorus of management experts specifically
identifies the emphasis on “sharp elbows” that such systems produce as
counterproductive. Even some of the original champions of these corporate
“reforms” describe the hypercompetitive practices that have resulted as
negative-sum competitions that destroy teamwork, undermine ethical
practices,12 and reduce long-term institutional health. 13 Indeed, Forbes
referred to Microsoft’s rank-and-yank system as “The Management
Approach Guaranteed to Wreck Your Best People.” 14

9. See, e.g., Jack Welch, Jack Welch: ‘Rank-and-Yank’? That’s Not How It’s Done, WALL
STREET
J.
(Nov.
14,
2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303789604579198281053673534 [https://perma.cc/E4MC-SXCS] (outlining
the positive aspects of differentiation and explaining how it benefits companies).
10. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return
of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1178–81 (2013) (arguing that shorttermism provides a reason to believe that shareholder primacy has resulted in both diminished
investors’ returns and in the demise of the public corporation).
11. See, e.g., RETHINKING C APITALISM: ECONOMICS AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE AND
INCLUSIVE GROWTH 7 (Michael Jacobs & Mariana Mazzucato eds., 2016) (linking “secular
stagnation,” or low productivity growth, to short-termism and a decline in investment).
12. Perhaps the most notable scholar to recant is Michael C. Jensen, who helped usher in
modern executive compensation systems. See Michael C. Jensen, Paying People to Lie: The Truth
About the Budgeting Process, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 379, 379–80 (2003) (observing that using budgets
or targets in organizations’ performance measurement and compensation systems has encouraged
gaming the system); see also Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral
Consequences of “Pay for Performance”, 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 535 (2014) (describing the
counterproductive effects of modern executive compensation).
13. The impact on institutional health is a product of three overlapping forces. First is the
emphasis on shareholder primacy and the short-termism associated with it. See RETHINKING
CAPITALISM, supra note 11, at 7 (explaining how “secular stagnation” or low productivity growth
is connected to short-termism and declines in investment); Stout, supra note 10, at 1176 (explaining
that shareholder primacy is extremely profitable for many corporate executives since stock price is
easy to manipulate in the short term). Second is pay-for-performance and the perverse incentives it
creates. See Stout, supra note 12, at 535 (noting the link between companies that have adopted
incentive pay compensation plans and outbreaks in corporate fraud, scandal, and even firm failure
at those companies). Third is financialization, both because of the promotion of short-termism in
publicly traded companies and because of the incentives in financial firms to promote opaque
products at the expense of customers and long-term institutional health. See, e.g., CLAIRE A. H ILL
& R ICHARD W. P AINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS
THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT 102–03 (2015) (describing some unethical business
practices that contributed to the financial crisis and explaining how lack of attention to clients’ needs
reduces institutional health over time).
14. Erika Andersen, The Management Approach Guaranteed to Wreck Your Best People,
FORBES (July 6, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikaandersen/2012/07/06/the-managementapproach-guaranteed-to-wreck-your-best-people/#27fc6eeb5743 [https://perma.cc/JYY9-YS6P].
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A second literature looks at the failure of antidiscrimination law to
address the increasing gender gaps in the new economy. 15 To be sure, overall
gender disparities, including the wage gap between men’s and women’s
earnings, have narrowed.16 Yet the trends have moved in the opposite
direction at the top. Controlling for a broader range of factors, such as
education and hours worked, the extent to which men have outpaced women
has been particularly dramatic for those with earnings above the ninetieth
percentile of income.17 Today, the greatest gender disparities occur in
portions of the economy that have shown the greatest growth in
compensation—including the upper management ranks of companies like
Microsoft and of the financial sector generally. This second literature
overwhelmingly concludes that these gender disparities arise from structural
forces that Title VII has had difficulty addressing. 18
Legal scholars, courts, and legislatures have developed these two
literatures as separate discourses.19 This Article is the first to consider how
the negative-sum competition and growing gender disparities in the upper
echelons of the economy are intrinsically intertwined and how they then
undermine the core promises of antidiscrimination law. As it shows, so long

15. See, e.g., Arianne Renan Barzilay & Anat Ben-David, Platform Inequality: Gender in the
Gig-Economy, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 393, 394 (2017) (stating that “although women work for
more hours on [a digital] platform, women’s average hourly rates are significantly lower than
men’s”); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L.
REV. 17, 26 (2010) (noting that female CEOs of nonprofits earn nearly 35% less than their male
counterparts); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, D IVERSITY IN HIGH TECH 2 (2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports/hightech/ [https://perma.cc/JX5W-A2Q3] (finding
that women are underrepresented in the “high tech” sector as compared to private industry as a
whole).
16. See Sonja C. Kassenboehmer & Mathias G. Sinning, Distributional Changes in the Gender
Wage Gap, 67 INDUS. & L AB. REL. REV. 335, 335, 348, 355 (2014) (noting that the gender wage
gap has steadily fallen since the 1970s and providing further evidence that the gap is narrowing
more for the bottom percentiles of wage earners than at the top percentiles).
17. See ELISE GOULD ET AL., WHAT IS THE GENDER P AY GAP AND IS IT REAL? 9, 11 (2016),
http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/112962.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4ST-XLNR] (finding that female wage
earners at the 95th percentile are paid 73.8% of the wages that men at the 95th percentile are paid).
18. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460, 462–65 (2001) (labeling structural forces that lead to
workplace biases as “second generation” discrimination and calling for a regulatory framework to
disrupt these biases); cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (arguing that a structural approach to
antidiscrimination law is unlikely to be successful under the current statutory framework). See
generally Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 91–101 (2015) (proposing that
the goal of antidiscrimination law should be to target systemic, structural forms of bias, as opposed
to a goal of protecting immutable traits).
19. A limited exception is the literature that developed following the financial crisis
commenting on the relative dearth of women in the decision-making centers most responsible for
the crisis. See generally SCANDALOUS ECONOMICS: GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL
CRISES (Aida A. Hozić & Jacqui True eds., 2016). This literature, however, does not address
antidiscrimination law or the potential legal remedies.
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as the discourses remain separate, counterproductive business practices that
contribute to societal inequality and entrench group-based disparities escape
censure because these practices simply look like routine, legally justifiable
business decisions.
This Article argues for a substantive engagement with the legitimacy of
the business practices that systematically produce gender disparities. 20 It
concludes that such an engagement is the first step in moving towards a
redefinition of equality in substantive terms, which returns to the origins of
antidiscrimination law and recasts it as part of a broader effort to address the
structural forces that simultaneously entrench group-based disparities and
restrain economic growth. Equality law involves the identification of
substantive employment practices inconsistent with a commitment to
economic equality and the delegitimization of these practices as
inappropriate when applied to any employee. 21 Consequently, our approach
combines traditional antidiscrimination analysis with consideration of
substantive justifications that determine the legitimacy of inequalityenhancing practices.
Part I explores the history of Title VII, showing that the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was enacted to dismantle the racially and sex-segregated workplaces
of midcentury America through the combination of antidiscrimination law,
economic stimulus, and education and training. As this history shows, Title
VII needs to be interpreted in light of the economic realities of the
employment systems in which it is operating if it is to remain effective in
combating discrimination.
Part II examines the new structural forces that simultaneously increase
income inequality in the economy 22 and gender disparities in the economic
sectors that have produced the greatest income growth. The new economy,
which has arisen with the information revolution and globalization, has
replaced the lock-step career ladders and relatively egalitarian tiers of the

20. This Article focuses only on the relationship between negative-sum workplace competitions
and gender disparities because of the distinctive interaction between gender and negative-sum
workplace competitions. Similar practices may influence disparities based on race, age, or other
legally actionable categories. See, e.g., Karraker v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir.
2005) (prohibiting the use of a personality inventory as a basis for promotion because of its impact
on those with disabilities).
21. This Article, however, does not take a position on whether “equality” in some abstract sense
should always be favored at the expense of other objectives. Nor does it suggest that the fact that a
practice increases inequality is grounds to consider it illegitimate per se. Instead, the Article
maintains only that where practices contribute to overall economic inequality or to race, gender, and
other disparities, their substantive justifications on business terms should be interrogated rather than
assumed.
22. See, e.g., Timothy Noah, Income Inequality: Panel on Financialization, Economic
Opportunity, and the Future of American Democracy, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 57, 60–61 (2013)
(arguing that income inequality has risen worldwide but that its growth has been particularly
pronounced in the United States).
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industrial era with workplaces that valorize individualism and competition. 23
These workplaces generate much more steeply banked income hierarchies 24
that threaten to undermine teamwork, productivity, and investment in the
future.
The new economy also creates a triple bind for women who become less
likely to seek out these newer workplaces, less likely to be seen as having the
qualities necessary to succeed within them, and more likely to be penalized
when they display the same self-interested qualities as the men, further
discouraging future female applicants.25 This section establishes the links
between the new management system and the exacerbation of gender
disparities, showing the need for a reorientation in the focus of
antidiscrimination law.
Part III shows how these structural changes explain the failure of
antidiscrimination law to deal with individual cases similar to the one Ellen
Pao brought against Kleiner Perkins, while opening the door to more
effective claims such as Katherine Moussouris’s class action suit against
Microsoft. Pao’s suit took the Kleiner Perkins evaluation system as a given,
requiring an intrinsically subjective evaluation of whether her contributions
to the company outweighed her “sharp elbows” in the same way they did for
the men. In contrast, the Moussouris case made the validity of the underlying
business practices the central legal issue. The case focused attention not just
on Microsoft’s failure to create an environment in which women could thrive,
but also on the systemic links between negative-sum competitions and gender
disparities. This section thus argues that antidiscrimination efforts, to be more
effective, need to challenge the background business practices that are
embedded in corporate cultures.
The conclusion explores how equality law might be remade. The
original passage of antidiscrimination law took aim at the structural factors
that produced segregated workplaces and sought not just to outlaw
discrimination but to address the economic forces that perpetuated market
segmentation. In contrast, modern antidiscrimination discourse has tended to

23. See June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 1000,
1002–05, 1008–09, 1029 (2017) (recognizing the increasingly competitive and individualistic
market that has arisen since the industrial era).
24. Id. at 1002.
25. Of course, not all women act in the same way, and many of the stereotypes about women
are just that—stereotypes. See, e.g., CORDELIA F INE, TESTOSTERONE REX: MYTHS OF SEX,
SCIENCE, AND SOCIETY 86–87, 107 (2017) (demonstrating that patterns of behavioral characteristics
depend on a mosaic of factors and circumstances other than genetic and hormonal factors
determined by sex); Coren Apicella & Johanna Mollderstrom, Women Do Like to Compete—
Against Themselves, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/
opinion/sunday/women-do-like-to-compete-against-themselves.html
[https://perma.cc/R7K5C2ST] (reviewing a study that found women are just as competitive as men when they were
choosing to compete against their own past performance).
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separate consideration of the structural factors producing the tournament
mentality from the greater inequality the tournament creates, treating the
resulting gender disparities as either presumptively valid or outside of the
scope of Title VII altogether.26 The re-creation of a substantive equality
approach would identify the structural forces that produce inequality and
consider the legitimacy of the underlying practices. Where the practices
cannot be justified, they should be rooted out through the combination of
antidiscrimination law and structural reforms. 27 This Article is thus a first
step toward reuniting equality promotion with antidiscrimination approaches.
I.

Antidiscrimination Law and the Ideal of Equality

Congress enacted Title VII and related laws at the height of the Civil
Rights movement of mid-twentieth-century America. 28 Yet, while these laws
clearly condemned discrimination in employment, they did not just seek to
promote racial and gender equality in isolation. Instead, their proponents
aspired to address what they saw as a broad-based structural issue: the
segmentation of the economy that marginalized women and minority workers
and obstructed economic growth. 29 White men during this period already
enjoyed a remarkable degree of economic equality, security, and wage

26. See Sturm, supra note 18, at 466, 468–69 (asserting that modern antidiscrimination results
“as a byproduct of ongoing interactions shaped by the structures of day-to-day decision-making and
workplace relationships” rather than as a “consequence[] of a long-standing structure of job
segregation”); Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 3 (“[S]tructural employment inequalities cannot be
solved without going beyond the generally accepted normative underpinnings of antidiscrimination
law.”).
27. For an example of different voter structures that are unrelated to gender disparities, see
Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 541, 576–77, 579 (2016).
28. This was a period in which income inequality had fallen markedly, led primarily by gains
for working class white men and more restrained executive and professional incomes. See Claudia
Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The U.S. Wage Structure at Mid-Century, 107
Q. J. ECON. 1, 2–6, 9 (1992) (analyzing America’s wage structure using Census data to show that
inequality took a dramatic plunge during the 1940s and rose only slightly in the 1950s and 1960s).
The Gini coefficient—the most widely accepted statistical measure of income inequality in a
country—shows a four-decade rise in America’s income inequality since the late 1960s to today.
The Major Trends in U.S. Income Inequality Since 1947, POLITICAL C ALCULATIONS (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://politicalcalculations.blogspot.com/2013/12/the-major-trends-in-us-income.html#
[https://perma.cc/XJR6-7NVF].
29. See, e.g., Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal
Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 305, 322 (2013) (noting the role of “labor-management concordat” following World War
II in which “labor unions received income and benefits sufficient to carry their members into the
middle class”). For data showing the steady increase in household income between 1950 and 1965,
see U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF T HE CENSUS, SER. P-60, NO. 43, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS: INCOME OF F AMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED S TATES: 1963, at 1
(1964) (concluding that “[m]edian family income in current dollars . . . more than doubled in the
postwar period” between 1947 and 1963).
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growth,30 so the goal was to make these opportunities available to other
groups.31 President Kennedy initially proposed what became the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as well as other antidiscrimination measures, as part of a
multifaceted approach that linked antidiscrimination efforts to economic
equality and national prosperity. 32
Modern Title VII scholars argue that today’s limits on the advancement
of women and minorities have become “structural” in nature, following from
the change in promotion practices from lockstep advancement to
performance pay and lateral moves that rest on “patterns of interaction,
informal norms, networking, mentoring, and evaluation.”33 Yet, Title VII’s
origins indicate that it sought to delegitimize a much more explicit form of
structural inequality—the segmentation of the labor market into white male
jobs with security, benefits, and lockstep patterns of advancement, and other
less attractive jobs for black men, white women, and black women.
This section reviews the development of antidiscrimination employment
laws. It first explores the legislative history that demonstrates the structural
nature of the antidiscrimination efforts, Congress’s focus on opening portals
to jobs that provided security and advancement, and the nature of the links
between those laws and the parallel efforts to promote economic growth.
Second, it examines the early cases interpreting Title VII and their
relationship to the structural purpose of the legislation. Third, the section
assesses the success of the antidiscrimination efforts, demonstrating that their
principal successes came from the structural reforms they produced.
A.

Title VII’s Structural Approach
Advocates of the enactment of Title VII, designed to focus on
discrimination in employment, recognized that the restricted access to “good
jobs” 34 helped to keep wages for these positions high by restricting the pool

30. See generally CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: T HE S TATE OF WHITE AMERICA 1960–
2010, at 170–83 (2012) (documenting the stability of white men’s jobs during the 1960s).
31. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2705, 2732 (1964) (statement of Rep. Nix).
32. See John F. Kennedy, Report to the American People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963),
https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/LH8F_0Mzv0e6Ro1yEm74Ng.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JLK5-H6PT]:
One hundred years of delay have passed since President Lincoln freed the slaves, yet
their heirs, their grandsons, are not fully free. They are not yet freed from the bonds of
injustice. They are not yet freed from social and economic oppression. And this Nation,
for all its hopes and all its boasts, will not be fully free until all its citizens are free.
33. Sturm, supra note 18, at 458.
34. See ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE R ISE OF POLARIZED AND
PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED S TATES, 1970S TO 2000S, at 5–6 (2011)
(laying out the different dimensions of a “good job,” which include compensation and fringe
benefits, job security and opportunities for advancement, and the ability to control work activities
and schedules).
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of potential employees. 35 This had the further effect of discouraging
investment in the human capital of those excluded and meant that general
efforts to boost employment through macroeconomic policies did not
necessarily reach the entire country. As a result, discrimination hurt not just
those treated unfavorably by the discrimination but the economy as a whole. 36
In 1963, President Kennedy proposed antidiscrimination legislation that
framed the effort to prohibit employment discrimination in terms of
promoting greater economic growth. He entered office during a recession,
persuaded Congress to adopt tax cuts and other stimulus measures, and yet
was frustrated by the fact that while corporate profits soared, unemployment
remained stubbornly high. 37 Indeed, the legislative history of Title VII
identified the expansion of the labor market to include full utilization of the
country’s human resources as a matter of national interest—and full
employment as a national policy—separate and apart from antidiscrimination
as an important objective. 38
Kennedy saw the solution as a three-part effort to reduce inequality.
First, he introduced Title VII, which sought to dismantle racially segregated
workplaces that Kennedy argued served to obstruct economic growth. 39
Second, he proposed continuation of the economic stimulus that had already
boosted business profits, implicitly recognizing that without jobs for
everyone, antidiscrimination efforts might simply lower the benefits
associated with white male workplaces. 40 Third, he advocated education and
training efforts for African Americans so that non-job-related disparities in
the qualifications of potential employees could not be used to justify

35. See Ruth G. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 MICH. J.L. REFORM 397, 401–02, 410–15 (1979) (noting that despite
increases in total employment representation, women and minorities were still channeled into
traditionally segregated occupations and were paid discriminatorily depressed wages).
36. See 110 CONG. REC. 2705, 2737 (1964) (consideration of H.R. 7152, statement of Rep.
Libonati) (“To permit a continuance of these practices of discrimination is to destroy the ambitions
of a race of Americans and stunt our economy.”).
37. See President John F. Kennedy, Message to Congress Presenting the President’s First
Economic Report (Jan. 22, 1962) (beginning his remarks by noting that the economy had “regained
its momentum” but emphasizing his dedication to combating prolonged unemployment).
38. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2705, 2732 (1964) (consideration of H.R. 7152, statement of
Rep. Nix) (“[T]he economic health of the Nation would be improved through fuller and fairer
utilization of available and potential manpower.”).
39. See Kennedy, supra note 32 (imploring Americans to support civil rights legislation).
40. See President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress: Program for Economic
Recovery and Growth (Feb. 2, 1961) (proposing federal intervention to reverse economic recession,
including, among other things, special tax incentives to spark investment, federal investment in
human resources and natural resources, and government action to manage labor productivity and
price stability).
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segregated workplaces. 41 All three efforts focused on opening what had been
“narrow portals” into entry-level employment opportunities. 42 This structural
focus on the American economy framed the legislation.
Although Title VII did not originally address sex discrimination, the
inclusion of “sex”—on the floor of the House of Representatives 43—served
as a recognition that women faced many of the same forms of explicitly
discriminatory practices as racial minorities. The want ads of the day, after
all, listed job openings under “male” and “female” categories, signaling the
gendered nature of employment.44 Moreover, career advancement depended
to a much greater degree than today on winning access to entry-level
positions in a relatively smaller number of large corporations. 45 Howard
Smith of Virginia, who proposed the addition of sex discrimination to the
bill, appeared to be motivated by the structural nature of the legislation. 46 He
41. See Kennedy, supra note 32 (discussing the importance of providing educational
opportunities to African Americans in order to eradicate workplace disparities). Kennedy’s original
proposal did not address sex discrimination. Id.
42. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99–100 (2003) (citing Katherine
V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor
and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 535 (2001) (describing midcentury American jobs as
“characterized by job ladders, limited ports of entry, and implicit contracts for long-term job
security”)).
43. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2547,
2577–84 (1964) (amendment offered by Rep. Smith)).
44. Want Ads, STATE (June 1, 1958), http://www.teachingushistory.org/ttrove/wantads.htm
[https://perma.cc/4GM4-MRA4]. For a broader discussion of the nature of sex segregation before
and after passage of the antidiscrimination acts, see Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 415, concluding
that even after passage of Title VII, sex-segregated jobs accounted for as much or more of the
gendered wage gap as unequal treatment within the same jobs.
45. See Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 412 (observing that white and minority men both enjoy
upward wage trajectories over time (with smaller gains for minority men) while women’s income
curves tend to remain flat).
46. See 110 CONG. REC. 2547, 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Smith). Although the
conventional story is that the addition of “sex” was an afterthought, designed to sink the legislation,
this appears to be a myth. Some commentators maintain that the amendment to add “sex” by racist
Representative Howard Smith of Virginia was intended to mock the bill and thwart its passage. Clay
Risen, The Accidental Feminist, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and
_politics/jurisprudence/2014/02/the_50th_anniversary_of_title_vii_of_the_civil_rights_act_and_t
he_southern.html [https://perma.cc/GKQ8-XLR8]. But see Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for
the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy
of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1339 (2014)
(arguing that Smith in fact supported women’s rights). In the House of Representatives, the
amendment passed by a somewhat anemic vote of 168 to 133. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative
History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 442 (1966); see also Arianne Renan Barzilay,
Parenting Title VII: Rethinking the History of the Sex Discrimination Prohibition, 28 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 55, 94 (2016) (discussing the vote on the Smith amendment); Serena Mayeri,
Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 718–21 (2015)
(providing insight into the intersectional arguments offered during passage for the inclusion of sex
discrimination protections); Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the
Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
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supported women’s rights (as well as the racism common in the Virginia of
his day), and observed that he “did not want ‘his’ women to take second place
to men and women of other races.”47 He thus understood that a principal
effect of antidiscrimination law would be to increase access to a larger
number of good jobs, tempting employers in need of low-wage workers to
look to women to fill the gaps—unless the law prohibited both race and sex
discrimination. 48
Similarly, African-American women saw racial and gender equality as
linked for analogous reasons.49 Discrimination on the basis of race and sex
relegated them out of more desirable jobs altogether. 50 Pauli Murray argued
that segregated workplaces allowed employers to pit workers against each
other.51 Antidiscrimination law, by breaking down the barriers that
segmented these workplaces by race and gender, and while continuing an
economic stimulus that kept the pressure on wage growth, promised to lift
the floor, allowing all workers to enjoy the same benefits as white males and
eliminating the existence of marginalized groups who could be hired for less
and set in opposition to each other. 52
B.

The Judicial Construction of Title VII and the Antidiscrimination
Principle
By the early seventies, the integration of antidiscrimination law with
efforts to promote more general economic equality largely came to an end.
& L. 137, 137–38 (1997) (providing further support for the view that the sex discrimination
amendment was not added as a “joke” or political ploy, but instead added as a result of political
pressure from various actors in support of women’s rights).
47. Case, supra note 46, at 1340.
48. Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, who supported the amendment, also claimed that without
it, “white women will be last at the hiring gate.” 110 CONG. REC. 2547, 2578–80 (1964) (statement
of Rep. Griffiths).
49. While tensions existed from the beginning between advocates of racial and gender equality,
African-American women embraced the new law. Even before the antidiscrimination law passed,
black women were more likely to be in the workplace, more likely to be single mothers, and less
likely to enjoy protections available to blue-collar men or to more privileged women. They thus saw
antidiscrimination laws as providing a vehicle to fight the marginalization of the positions open to
them. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1326–27 & n.87 (2012) (reviewing the debate over the inclusion of “sex” in
Title VII); Serena Mayeri, “A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal
and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1058 (2001) (highlighting the link scholars
observed between low occupational attainment and social discrimination).
50. See Mayeri, supra note 46, at 718–21 (noting that African-American women advocated for
a sex discrimination prohibition during the Title VII passage).
51. Id. at 720–21.
52. See id. at 723–24 (observing that early legal victories contributed to the elimination of
marginalized groups in the workplace); see also Ruth Gerber Blumrosen, Remedies for Wage
Discrimination, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 99, 102 (1986) (observing that under “ordinary Title VII
analysis, proof that the employer segregated women and minorities in low-paying positions would
be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination”).
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Stagflation, rather than recession, dogged the economy, and the Nixon
Administration distanced itself from the “War on Poverty’s” more ambitious
equality-enhancing measures.53 The antidiscrimination principle remained
important, however, and the courts refined the Title VII approach through
judicial decisions that continued the efforts to dismantle segregated
workplaces.
These decisions reflected Title VII’s structural origin as an effort to
delegitimize all-white and all-male workplaces. The courts questioned some
business practices, such as written examinations, that they saw as designed
to maintain the racially identified workplaces of the pre-Title VII era. We
maintain, however, that the courts were unwilling to engage the substantive
legitimacy of other practices, such as the unavailability of temporary leaves;
not only did the courts not see these practices as part of a system of maleidentified workplaces, but they also accepted, as a legitimate business
justification, that employers do not have an obligation to extend temporary
leaves, regardless of the reason. 54 As we will illustrate below, significant
progress in this arena came only with substantive consideration of the
question of whether employers should bear the cost of such accommodations,
not from the antidiscrimination principle operating in isolation.
The early cases addressing sex discrimination illustrate the tensions.
Given the relatively late addition of the category “sex” to the statute, there
was little legislative history to guide the courts and, in particular, no
expression of congressional intent with respect to women’s family
obligations.55 The courts, however, interpreted sex discrimination in much
the same way as they interpreted race discrimination, that is, as barring
explicit barriers to hiring. Thus, the first U.S. Supreme Court case to interpret
Title VII reasoned that the law proscribed a sex-based classification that
prohibited hiring mothers (though not fathers) with preschool age children, 56

53. Brian C. Kalt, Wade H. McCree, Jr., and the Office of the Solicitor General, 1977–1981,
1998 DET. C.L. MICH. S T. U. L. REV. 703, 709 (noting that “[t]he relative economic prosperity of
the Sixties, which had allowed for the bold liberal social experiments of the Great Society, had given
way to the ‘stagflation’ of the Seventies, which was less conducive to progressive policy”).
54. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (ruling that Title VII does not
include pregnancy discrimination). Not until 2007 did the EEOC explain how to approach “family
responsibilities discrimination.” U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY C OMM’N, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL D ISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH C AREGIVING
RESPONSIBILITIES
(2007),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html#background
[https://perma.cc/RE9X-8XPF].
55. From the beginning, advocates of this era drew analogies between race discrimination and
sex discrimination with respect to workplace segregation. See Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood,
Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 239 (1965)
(arguing that sex discrimination, like race discrimination, treated women as inferior and created a
caste-like status that justified occupational segregation and discrimination).
56. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (describing the policy as an
explicit gender-based classification).
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and a subsequent case upheld a prohibition on male and female want ads
against a First Amendment challenge.57 At the same time, however, the Court
rejected efforts to consider different treatment based on pregnancy as a form
of discrimination, leaving the issue to Congress. 58 The Supreme Court of that
era saw pregnancy as a matter of individual choice;59 it did not treat
pregnancy as a structural obstacle to women’s workplace access of a kind
with the types of barriers Congress intended Title VII to address. 60
The same dichotomy runs through the courts’ allocation of the burden
of proof. Once employers moved away from explicitly race- or sex-based
classifications, the courts struggled with the question of what proof would
establish discriminatory intent. They became more likely to infer wrongful
intent where the practice itself could be discredited, and more reluctant to do
so where the business practice was treated as presumptively legitimate. 61
In individual cases alleging disparate treatment, the Supreme Court
established a burden-shifting framework that finds “comparator” evidence to
be “[e]specially relevant.” 62 In these cases, courts allowed plaintiffs—who
otherwise lacked sufficient direct evidence of bias—to prove discrimination
by establishing unequal treatment between two employees; an inference of
discrimination would arise if the employer treated the member of the
protected class, such as a woman, less favorably than a comparably situated

57. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 387–89 (1973)
(finding the want ads to be illegal commercial activity, similar to hypothetical ads captioned
“Narcotics for Sale” or “Prostitutes Wanted,” and holding that any First Amendment interest served
by the advertisements was absent).
58. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
59. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136 (agreeing that pregnancy is unlike illnesses and more like a
voluntary condition); Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494–95 (noting that a state cannot be compelled to
recognize normal pregnancies as physical disabilities for purposes of insurance plans).
60. At the time Title VII was passed, only 30% of married mothers with children under the age
of eighteen were in the labor force. Sharon R. Cohany & Emy Sok, Trends in Labor Force
Participation of Married Mothers of Infants, MONTHLY L AB. REV., Feb. 2007, at 10,
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2007/02/art2full.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ6Z-94RD]. The big
increases in women’s labor force participation would come between 1980 and 2000. Id. Since then,
there has been much greater commitment to women’s workplace inclusion, and recognition that full
inclusion of women in the workplace requires treating pregnancy and family responsibilities as a
matter of workplace structure. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 85 (2000) (citing
surveys from the 1990s, including one in which 80% of corporations responded that they did not
believe they could remain competitive without addressing work–family and diversity issues).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 62–101.
62. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); see also Stephanie
Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS & C LARK L.
REV. 919, 942 (2016) (“Over time, such ‘comparator’ evidence became expected and even required
by some federal courts, posing a challenge for plaintiffs alleging second generation discrimination,
particularly in an era of occupational segregation.”).
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male employee. 63 The Court emphasized that while a prospective employee
must show that she met the qualifications for the job, Title VII required “the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment” that
discriminated on the basis of race or other impermissible classifications. 64
The comparator test tied proof of discriminatory motive to assumptions
about segregated workplaces. The foundational case, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,65 involved a large industrial workplace with many employees
performing relatively similar duties. 66 The Court assumed that where such an
employer announced an opening, rejected a qualified African-American
applicant, and kept the position open, then the plaintiff has met the “initial
burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination.” 67 The Court allowed the employer to rebut the inference
through the articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
rejection of the African-American applicant. 68 Typically, in these cases, an
employer who could show a practice of interracial hiring had an easier time
rebutting the inference than one who maintained an all-white workforce. 69
The ordering of the burden of proof thus reinforced the presumptive
illegitimacy of all-white workplaces and the rejection of otherwise qualified
African-American applicants, tying both to an inference of discriminatory
motive.
The McDonnell Douglas framework and the later expansion of the idea
of comparing the rejected plaintiff to the person hired were intended as
sorting devices—to sort plausible cases from implausible ones. Suzanne
Goldberg and other scholars have argued that this comparator requirement
does not work well in modern workplaces, which are much less likely to
employ only white males or to have standardized assignments of
responsibility.70 Indeed, in the context of employer actions that may be
intrinsically individualized and subjective, courts have adopted strict
63. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 745–46
(2011) (detailing the rise of the “comparator” methodology and arguing against courts’ reliance on
these evaluative devices).
64. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–
31 (1971)).
65. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
66. Id. at 794; see Goldberg, supra note 63, at 755 (observing that this system had the potential
to work well in “large, Tayloresque workplaces, where multiple workers engage in tasks that are
susceptible to relatively straightforward comparison”).
67. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 623–24 (5th Cir. 1997) (observing that
the fact that 88% of the work force was comprised of minorities undercut the plaintiff’s claim of
discriminatory motive).
70. See Goldberg, supra note 63, at 755–56 (noting that the comparator theory is mismatched
with the modern workplace because of “the flexible and dynamic nature of many contemporary
jobs”).
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requirements for comparators who can establish the requisite employer intent
without more direct proof of discriminatory motive. 71 While the need for
comparators in these terms limits the ability of antidiscrimination law to
reach cases of disparate treatment, the real problem is the absence of a
substantive equality ideal supported by government mandates 72—or
identification of specific practices of wrongful conduct. Since employers no
longer create entirely white or entirely male workforces, however, the
wrongful conduct is no longer connected to practices, such as examinations
that were historically used to exclude protected groups; instead, the
determination of when a business practice is “illegitimate” because it
disproportionately affects protected groups requires reconsideration.
A comparable dichotomy underlies disparate impact law, the second
means the Supreme Court developed for addressing the subtler forms of
discrimination. Disparate impact analysis differs from disparate treatment
cases in that given sufficient proof that an employment practice has a
disparate impact on a suspected class, no proof of discriminatory intent is
necessary.73
The Supreme Court intitially set out the elements of the disparate impact
doctrine in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.74 Before Title VII, the Duke Power
Company, headquartered in Charlotte, N.C., “had intentionally segregated its
workforce, restricting its African American employees to generally
undesirable jobs.” 75 During the fifties, the company imposed a high school
degree requirement for assignment to the company’s better-paid positions,
and after Title VII became effective, it required those seeking employment
or transfers to pass two written examinations. 76 Only one of the African
Americans in a position to seek reassignment was a high school graduate,77

71. See, e.g., Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App’x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010):
Plaintiffs are required to show that they are similar in all relevant respects to their
comparator. Such a showing would include evidence that the employees ‘dealt with
the same supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards and . . . engaged in the same
conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would
distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.’
72. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995,
1096, 1101 (2015) (illustrating courts’ reluctance to read antidiscrimination provisions as mandating
pregnancy accommodations, however important such accommodations might be to women’s
workforce participation; such accommodations have been viewed as special treatment rather than
equal treatment).
73. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 705–
06 (2006).
74. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
75. See Selmi, supra note 73, at 717 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1227–
29 (4th Cir. 1970) (“Until 1966, no Negro had ever held a position at [the plant] in any department
other than the Labor Department.”)).
76. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427–28.
77. Selmi, supra note 73, at 717 n.63.
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and whites passed the tests nearly ten times as often as African Americans.78
A unanimous Supreme Court found the tests to be discriminatory, and the
case set the paradigm for a successful disparate impact suit. 79 Disparate
impact analysis has been criticized as encouraging employers to create
quotas; only with an integrated workforce can employers insulate themselves
from the threat of litigation. Yet in the context of workplaces, like Duke
Power Company, that have a long history of discrimination, that is exactly
what antidiscrimination law sought to accomplish. 80
Feminists and other antidiscrimination scholars have argued for an
expansion of disparate impact theory to reach a variety of employment
practices that have a differential impact on protected groups. 81 This has been
difficult, as Michael Selmi explains, because the Supreme Court adopted the
disparate impact approach “to deal with specific practices, seniority systems
and written tests, that were perpetuating past intentional discrimination” and
that “the reality has been that the theory has proved an ill fit for any challenge
other than to written examinations . . . .”82 In contrast with the written
examination cases, courts routinely reject disparate impact challenges to
“part-time work, light duty requests, and disability policies [based on a
failure] to accommodate pregnancy . . . .”83 Indeed, courts do not interpret
Title VII or the Family and Medical Leave Act “to require disturbing core
business practices as a means of eradicating the disadvantage women suffer
as a result of their childbearing and childrearing responsibilities.”84
Efforts to extend disparate impact doctrine failed for the same reasons
as efforts to extend disparate treatment cases to pregnancy. Yet the question
of whether employers must “disturb core business practices” is not one about
78. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
79. See Selmi, supra note 73, at 723–24 (describing that although Griggs was initially seen as
a case about the validity of testing requirements, cases soon emerged that followed Griggs and
broadened the application of disparate impact liability).
80. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: T HE C ASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION L AWS 234–35 (1995) (arguing that proposed antidiscrimination legislation
created an “incentive structure” to “induce employers to adopt quotas on their own in order to
minimize liability under the disparate impact rules”). This purpose continues to animate disparate
impact cases. In Ward’s Cove Packing v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Supreme Court
attempted to water down the business necessity standard, complaining that it created an incentive
for employers to adopt quotas. Id. at 653. Congress responded by amending Title VII in 1991,
effectively overturning at least parts of Ward’s Cove. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat.
1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2012)). Disparate cases, such as the
firefighters’ litigation in New Haven, continue to address written-test requirements that have a
disproportionately exclusionary effect on African Americans. Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654
F.3d 200, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing African-American firefighters’ claims that oral and
written promotion exams caused an impermissible discriminatory impact under Title VII).
81. Selmi, supra note 73, at 704 & n.12 (collecting sources).
82. Id. at 705.
83. Id. at 750.
84. Id. at 751.

CAHN.TOP RINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

442

2/6/2018 10:50 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 96:425

impact on women or other protected groups standing in isolation. Instead, it
requires establishing the principle that employers should accommodate any
type of temporary disability for reasons that go beyond the needs of women
alone, identifying pregnant workers with other workers experiencing
temporary inability to lift heavy objects or to stand on their feet for long
periods, and building coalitions rather than emphasizing women’s
uniqueness in attempting to win workplace reforms. 85
Based on this core concept, the argument for recognition of pregnancybased discrimination claims thus became much stronger after Congress
amended the ADA to broaden its coverage to include temporary and minor
impairments, including lifting restrictions. 86 Extending workplace
protections for pregnant women requires seeing such protections not just as
a component of discrimination against women, but as part of a more general
effort to require employers to accommodate temporary disabilities. 87 Such
accommodations can be expensive, and they follow from a conclusion that
the employer, rather than the employee or a state insurance fund, is the right
recipient of the cost. Without the principle that employers must accommodate
disabilities, however, pregnancy accommodations involve “disturbing
[otherwise legitimate] core business practices” 88 or they become what the
Supreme Court termed “most-favored-[employee]” status, requiring the
extension of workplace benefits to pregnant women in accordance with the
most favorable of those available to other employees, an approach the Court
rejected.89
We thus classify disability (including pregnancy) accommodation as
one example of a substantive approach to “equality law”: that is, the
identification of particular employment practices inconsistent with a
commitment to economic equality, and delegitimization of these practices as
appropriate when applied to any employee. This approach requires not just
examination of the disparate impact on protected groups, but also substantive
engagement with the legitimacy of the practice on its own terms and a vision
of what equality (aside from freedom from overt discrimination) means.90

85. Schultz, supra note 72, at 1096, 1101.
86. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008)
(expanding the definition of “disability” under the ADA and clarifying that the “definition of
disability . . . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage”); Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as
“Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 486–87 (2012)
(arguing that because those with limitations similar to pregnant women can receive ADA benefits,
coverage should be broadened to pregnant women).
87. See Schultz, supra note 72, at 1096 (advocating a refusal to distance the problems of
pregnant workers from those faced by employees with other disabilities).
88. Selmi, supra note 73, at 751.
89. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1439 (2015).
90. This conclusion is different from the sameness versus difference debate that has long
occupied feminists. That debate addresses the question of whether antidiscrimination law should
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The signature accomplishment of feminist scholars—sexual harassment
law—illustrates this approach. Catharine MacKinnon successfully argued
that sexual harassment in the workplace constitutes sex discrimination and
that it should come within the purview of Title VII.91 Yet, sexual harassment,
once made visible, is illegitimate as a business practice for reasons that go
beyond the impact on its victims; where it is pervasive enough to constitute
a hostile work environment, it is also almost always an indication of poor
management practices. 92 Thus, a legal conclusion that sexual harassment
constitutes sex discrimination combines a judgment that it is both
discriminatory and unacceptable.
In this section, we have argued that antidiscrimination doctrine reflects
underlying judgments about the substantive acceptability of workplace
practices that have disparate effects on protected groups. Thus,
antidiscrimination law initially reflected a substantive determination not just
to outlaw bias, but to dismantle the market segmentation that created
exclusively white male, black male, white female, and black female
workplaces. In the early days of Title VII, the courts consistently refined and
extended the doctrine where necessary to advance that purpose, thus making
it easier to dismantle white male workplaces such as those at McDonnell
Douglas and Duke Power. Since then, when courts have cut back, Congress
has reaffirmed the principle in its amendments to Title VII.
The passage of antidiscrimination law did not, however, involve any
comparable commitment to addressing either the means of advancement
within integrated workplaces or the particular challenges that attend

seek to define discrimination in terms of treatment on the same terms as men or in terms of equal
results that take gender differences such as pregnancy into account. This approach is different in
that it identifies full economic inclusion as an appropriate societal objective and asks whether a
practice that marginalizes some workers, such as a refusal to grant temporary leaves, can be justified
in light of its marginalizing impact. The remedy can then take the form of both congressional
mandates such as the one in the ADA and policing of such mandates through antidiscrimination as
well as other efforts in appropriate cases.
91. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). Patricia J. Barry and Catharine A.
MacKinnon wrote the brief for the successful respondent, Mechelle Vinson. Id. at 58.
92. See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Inside Uber’s Aggressive, Unrestrained Workplace Culture, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/technology/uber-workplaceculture.html [https://perma.cc/YZX2-D46H] (summarizing criticism of Uber’s “aggressive culture”
and problems with its management); Valentina Zarya, In the Fight Against Sexual Harassment,
Money Trumps Morals, FORTUNE (June 21, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/21/uber-kalanickresigns/ [perma.cc/D9H4-TSAJ] (noting that multiple companies implemented changes after sexual
harassment claims were perceived to affect the company’s revenue). The practices that allowed
Harvey Weinstein to perpetrate sexual abuse over three decades included hush money, blacklisting,
“draconian nondisclosure agreements, and the cooptation of entities (such as agents and publishers)
that would otherwise prevent such abuse.” Brent Lang & Elizabeth Wagmeister, Judgment Day:
Harvey Weinstein Scandal Could Finally Change Hollywood’s Culture of Secrecy, VARIETY (Oct.
2017),
http://variety.com/2017/film/news/harvey-weinstein-game-over-judgment-day-scandalculture-secrecy-1202591437/ [https://perma.cc/BD5J-U7L3].
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discrimination based on a failure to respond to (“accommodate”) pregnancy
and family responsibilities. While, as this section has shown, Congress did
eventually recognize pregnancy discrimination as illegal, progress in
structuring employment to deal with family responsibilities has occurred
most consistently when Congress or the courts have engaged the underlying
legitimacy of the practices, explicitly or implicitly. With the waning of the
more general efforts to promote economic equality in the postwar years,
substantive engagement with the forces producing economic inequality has
been limited. Legal scholars and other advocates have therefore tried to
extend the antidiscrimination principle to do more of the heavy lifting
necessary to achieve greater equality, but where those efforts have not been
combined with a substantive discussion of the propriety of the practices
themselves, the success of such efforts has been limited. Thus, the courts
have been willing to use disparate impact theory to strike down employment
tests where they have the effect of perpetuating segregated workplaces,
which are clearly illegitimate under Title VII. Courts have been unwilling,
however, to address the failure to provide pregnancy accommodations in the
absence of either a more general requirement to include pregnant women in
the workplace or to accommodate all temporary physical limitations. The
distinction is not really about “disparate impact”—both sets of policies have
a disparate impact on certain groups. Instead, it involves a substantive
conception of the employer’s responsibility to promote equality—and of the
substantive propriety of business practices that pose obstacles to full
inclusion in the workplace.
C.

The Story of Title VII’s Success

The antidiscrimination laws of the sixties have been successful in
reducing gender- and race-based inequality by opening positions that had
previously been exclusively for white men to women and minorities.93 In the
first decade following adoption of Title VII, African Americans moved into
positions that had been closed to them, with corresponding gains in income. 94
During that decade, women increased their workforce participation to a
greater degree than other workers but did so overwhelmingly in the growing
number of predominately female clerical and service positions, and saw no
substantial income gains vis-à-vis white men.95 The major advances for

93. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 18, at 460 (observing that overt, race- and gender-based
classifications have become “things of the past” now that “[m]any employers . . . have formal
policies prohibiting race and sex discrimination, and procedures to enforce those policies”).
94. Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 413; Gavin Wright, The Regional Economic Impact of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 95 B.U. L. REV. 759, 766–78 (2015) (demonstrating black economic gains,
particularly associated with the decline in low-paying, primarily black workplaces in the South).
95. Blumrosen, supra note 35, at 412–13. The gender wage gap was 58.2% in 1968, 59.4% in
1978, and decreased to 66% in 1988. NAT’L COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, The Wage Gap over Time: In
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women would come instead during the eighties as they increased their
education levels and entered into the professions. 96
Both minorities’ gains in the sixties and seventies, and women’s gains
in the eighties,97 vindicated the assumptions associated with the passage of
antidiscrimination laws. 98 These laws opened up the “limited portals of entry”
into good jobs, allowed those who made it through the door to participate in
the career ladders available once inside, and did so without necessarily
undercutting the wages of white men who worked beside them. 99 These
assumptions all began to give way with the changing nature of workplaces.
By the end of the seventies, an assault began on the unionized
workplaces that had produced the relative income equality and senioritybased advancement of the postwar era.100 Although women who pursued
higher education in the seventies began to gain access to higher paying jobs
during this period, they did so as economic conditions created the basis for
much greater income inequality among white males as well as in the economy
more generally. And as the economy changed, judges grappled with the
question of the underlying meaning of antidiscrimination law: did it simply
mandate equal treatment by dismantling the racial and gender classifications
of earlier eras that limited access to “ports of entry,” 101 or could it be extended
to address the new forms of subordination women and minorities continued
to face within the organizations to which they had gained entry? Before
examining courts’ responses, we turn to an analysis of how corporate law and
certain business practices facilitate gender discrimination in the
contemporary economy.

Real Dollars, Women See a Continuing Gap (Sept. 2016), http://www.pay-equity.org/infotime.html [https://perma.cc/75U3-RNWA].
96. See Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and
Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730, 749–50 (2002) (detailing the
dramatic climb in female entrants to law schools, medical schools, and professional programs
starting in the 1970s).
97. Women benefitted more than blacks did, but blacks won the lawsuits. See Tamara Lytle,
Title VII Changed the Face of the American Workplace, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT.
(May 21,
2014),
https://www.shrm.org/publications/hrmagazine/editorialcontent/2014/0614/
pages/0614-civil-rights.aspx#sthash.g69i4wLm.dpuf [https://perma.cc/9DUR-LM2Y] (explaining
that “[i]n terms of sheer numbers, women have arguably benefited the most from the civil rights
law”).
98. See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and
Explanations 44 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21913, 2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21913.pdf [https://perma.cc/FD6C-SXHQ] (providing possible
explanations for the delay in wage gains realized by women under antidiscrimination laws).
99. MURRAY, supra note 30, at 175 fig.9.4 (showing the working-class white-male
unemployment rate to be below the national unemployment rate until after 1980).
100. See JEFFERSON COWIE, S TAYIN’ ALIVE: T HE 1970S AND THE L AST DAYS OF THE
WORKING CLASS 234 (2010) (reasoning that “faith in the unions was down” in the mid-1970s in
part because “individual advancement was in tension with stable income”).
101. Green, supra note 42, at 99–100.
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II.

Competition and Gender in the New Economy
When Congress enacted Title VII, it saw segregated workplaces as an
impediment to racial and gender equality and an obstacle to further economic
growth. Today, formal segregation has been dismantled, and women and
minorities enjoy much greater access to the entry-level positions of the new
economy. Yet, the source of economic inequality and of racial and gender
disparities has changed, creating new challenges for antidiscrimination law,
economic productivity, and societal equality.
Central to these changes is the transformation of the means of
advancement in the highly paid tiers of the new economy. Women have won
access to jobs as prison guards, and men can be flight attendants,102 but
gaining a foothold into entry-level jobs does not ensure security or
advancement. Instead, advancement depends to a much greater extent on
competition and individualism, with management structures designed to
reward such behavior.103
As other scholars have argued, the law’s failure to keep up with the
structural changes in the workplace has undermined the effectiveness of
antidiscrimination efforts. 104 They link antidiscrimination law’s failings to
two factors that have changed the nature of career advancement: the greater
role of flexible and subjective workplace interactions in determining raises,
promotions, and bonuses and the persistence of subtle or unconscious biases
that reinforce gender stereotyping. 105
Missing from their explanations, however, is an examination of the
forces that drive the selection process, their merits in supposedly neutral
business terms, and their supposedly unconscious biases. The scholarly
accounts suggest that accurate evaluations of individual employees would
eliminate the disparities, but do not consider why gender disparities not only

102. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that
being a female is not a “bona fide occupational qualification” for a flight attendant job); cf. Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331, 336–37 (1977) (holding that Alabama’s minimum weight and
height requirements for prison guards were discriminatory against females, but that based on the
circumstances of the particular prison, sex fell within the “bona-fide-occupational-qualification”
exception of Title VII, and thus further concluding that Alabama was not prohibited from excluding
women for “contact” positions in a maximum-security male prison).
103. Robert L. Laud & Matthew Johnson, Upward Mobility: A Typology of Tactics and
Strategies for Career Advancement, 17 CAREER DEV. INT’L 231, 241 (2012); see also Maxine
Eichner, Market-Cautious Feminism, 69 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 141, 160 (2016) (“[T]he workplace
should not be conceptualized as a sphere free from hierarchy or constraint.”).
104. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 18, at 537–38 (describing firms’ structural focus on “formal
compliance and avoidance of liability” and the judiciary’s deference to those internal structures as
“undercut[ting] the development and viability of a structural approach” to antidiscrimination
efforts); Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 3 (arguing that “courts and legislatures have proven unwilling
or unable” to take steps necessary to address biases inherent in the modern “boundaryless
workplace”).
105. Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 4–5.
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persist, but have in many cases increased most in the parts of the economy
that have enjoyed the greatest income growth. It is only with this
understanding, together with a willingness to engage the business merits of
the practices, that a new substantive equality approach can address these
structural forces that undermine Title VII’s effectiveness. In this section, we
analyze how the new economy has changed the terms of competition,
producing a disparate impact on women.
Section A explains how the structure of workforces has changed to
emphasize competition and individualism without necessarily benefiting
institutions. Section B documents how these changes have produced a shift
in the gendered wage gap, with the greatest disparities now occurring in a
relatively few places in the economy—those that have produced large income
disparities. Section C uses the analysis of the new economy to explain the
gender gap. It proposes that gender disparities have increased as women are
subjected to a reinforcing triple bind: they are less attracted to these
competitive workplaces; they are perceived as less able to compete on the
terms of the new economy; and they are disproportionately penalized for
displaying the same competitive traits the men demonstrate, reinforcing the
disinclination to apply for jobs (or promotions in) the most competitive
environments.
A.

Valorizing the Tournament
When Congress passed Title VII, large employers organized workers
into a system of tiers that made it relatively easy to base antidiscrimination
litigation on the use of comparators demonstrating disparate treatment of
otherwise similarly situated employees. A workplace based on tiers creates
pyramid-like systems of employee relationships that encourage employees
within each tier to identify with each other and, assuming stable employment,
with the institution itself. 106 Many of the largest employers were
manufacturers,107 union membership was high, 108 and workers at all levels of
income experienced similar growth. 109 Moreover, even within managerial

106. See Carbone & Levit, supra note 23, at 1012, 1015 (observing that this pyramid-like
system creates three groups with different identifications with the firm: (1) a management elite, (2) a
skilled group of largely fungible workers, and (3) a skilled group with company-specific
experience).
107. 1961 Full List, FORTUNE 500, http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500
_archive/full/1961/ [https://perma.cc/HN29-5T24].
108. Almost one-third of workers belonged to unions, compared to 10% today. Quoctrung Bui,
50 Years of Shrinking Union Membership in One Map, NPR (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02/23/385843576/50-years-of-shrinking-unionmembership-in-one-map [https://perma.cc/6S9Z-U5U4].
109. Consider that shortly after the Civil Rights Act, more than one-quarter of the workforce
was employed in the manufacturing sector; today, it is under 10%. Jennifer L. Raynor, Comparative
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ranks, employees tended to be promoted from below, and they identified with
company rather than individualistic aims. 110 Monetary incentives were
modest, if they existed at all, and corporate teams constrained self-interested
behavior that did not serve the collective interests of the group. 111 The
company “man” took with him the status that came from association with a
successful company;112 he had little ability to cash in and leave for greener
pastures.113
In contrast, the new system of steeply banked hierarchies encourages
top management to identify more with quarterly earnings (and higher share
price-motivated) shareholders than with their subordinates, employees to
compete against each other, and both groups (managers and employees) to
focus on short-term individual advancement rather than longer term
institutional health. Consequently, the “employers’ compact” with workers
has changed, providing much less protection. 114 Executive compensation has
become much more variable, and those enjoying the greatest gains do so in
ways that have become more portable. 115 Within this system, it may make
Civilian Labor Force Statistics, 10 Countries: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 2007, at
32, 37. With regards to growth,
[t]he 1940s to the late 1970s, while by no means a golden age (as evidenced, for
example, by the perpetuation of gender, ethnic, and race discrimination in the job
market), was a period in which workers from the lowest-paid wage earner to the
highest-paid CEO experienced similar growth in incomes. This was a period in which
“a rising tide” really did lift all boats.
ESTELLE SOMMEILLER & MARK PRICE, THE INCREASINGLY UNEQUAL STATES OF AMERICA:
INCOME INEQUALITY BY S TATE, 1917 TO 2012, at 6 (2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/incomeinequality-by-state-1917-to-2012/ [https://perma.cc/5N5F-BDVH].
110. Carbone & Levit, supra note 23, at 978; see also Wells, supra note 29, at 323–24
(observing that even the Harvard Business School emphasized this idea of stewardship).
111. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, T HE NEW INDUSTRIAL S TATE 116–17 (1967) (observing
that while corporate officers often owned stock or stock options, and had access to information from
which they could personally benefit, they rarely acted to advance their individual pecuniary interests
at the expense of the firm).
112. Carbone & Levit, supra note 23, at 977 n.58 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE C HIAPELLO, T HE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 94 n.lxix
(Gregory Elliott trans., 2005) (observing that the strength of firm identity and corresponding
employee loyalty weaken as firms become more dynamic and employee career paths involve more
lateral moves).
114. RICK WARTZMAN, THE END OF LOYALTY: T HE R ISE AND F ALL OF GOOD JOBS IN
AMERICA 312 (2017). For arguments that employee tenure, from the C-suite to the factory floor,
has diminished over the past thirty years, see Matthew J. Bidwell, What Happened to Long-Term
Employment? The Role of Worker Power and Environmental Turbulence in Explaining Declines in
Worker Tenure, 24 ORG. SCI. 1061, 1061, 1077–78 (2013) (studying the theories behind a
“persistent decline in the average duration of employment relationships within the United States”);
Guy Berger, Will this Year’s College Graduates Job-Hop More than Previous Grads?, LINKEDIN
BLOG (Apr. 12, 2016), https://blog.linkedin.com/2016/04/12/will-this-year_s-college-grads-jobhop-more-than-previous-grads [https://perma.cc/4R62-BSU6] (stating that the number of
companies young adults worked for in the first five years after college graduation doubled over the
last twenty years).
115. WARTZMAN, supra note 114, at 305–06.
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(personal, even if not institutional) sense for executives to adopt practices
that advance short-term objectives even if the process undermines the
company’s long-term institutional health. 116
The new system involves three mutually reinforcing practices. First, the
managerial system has been replaced with a system that promotes
“shareholder primacy,”117 thereby changing the institutional focus of publicly
traded corporations away from the long-term interests of the institutions and
toward the short-term interests of higher-stock-price-motivated
shareholders.118 “Short-termism” 119 separates the interests of shareholders
and executives from those of other corporate constituents such as employees
and customers.120 It also undermines the link between institutions and
investment in the future, as corporate officers focus to a greater degree on
immediate payoffs and less on investment in either employee training or
research with longer term payoffs. 121 A 2005 survey of 401 financial
executives, for example, reported that an overwhelming majority (78%)

116. See, e.g., June Carbone, Once and Future Financial Crises: How the Hellhound of Wall
Street Sniffed Out Five Forgotten Factors Guaranteed to Produce Fiascos, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1021,
1027 (2012) (“If the owners can realize sufficient benefit today, the fact that the company will be
worth nothing tomorrow will not matter and it will skew their decision-making in favor of activities
that increase short term profits even at the expense of the company’s survival.”) (citing George A.
Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, 1993, at 10).
117. Lynn Stout describes shareholder primacy as an “ideology” that “led to a number of
individually modest but collectively significant changes in corporate law and practice that had the
practical effect of driving directors and executives in public corporations to focus on share price as
their guiding star.” Stout, supra note 10, at 1177. While this dogma increased the emphasis on share
price as the principal measure of company (and thus executive) success, it also had the effect of
increasing CEO power vis-à-vis other company stakeholders such as employees. See William K.
Black & June Carbone, Economic Ideology and the Rise of the Firm as a Criminal Enterprise, 49
AKRON L. REV. 371, 397 & n.155 (2016). The ideology, however, does not necessarily advance the
interest of all shareholders. “As many have observed, (1) shareholders have different ‘investment
horizons’ based on the planned duration of shareholding; (2) shareholders with shorter investment
horizons have different interests from those with longer investment horizons; and (3) the different
interests of short-term shareholders lead to different corporate governance and policy preferences
from those of longer-term shareholders.” Robert Anderson IV, The Long and Short of Corporate
Governance, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 19, 23 (2015).
118. Carbone & Levit, supra note 23, at 966.
119. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 265, 268 (2012) (defining “short-termism,” which is also referred to as “earnings
management” or “managerial myopia,” and demonstrating its contributory role in the 2008 financial
crisis).
120. See, e.g., HILL & P AINTER, supra note 13, at 102–03 (noting how bankers are more willing
to behave in ways that will increase short-term payout even if it means the bank’s long-term
reputation will suffer).
121. See infra note 333 and accompanying text. These pressures have contributed to the
creation of a more contingent workforce as companies mechanize or outsource labor (whether
overseas or to the janitorial firm down the street) to transfer the costs associated with variable
demand to others. See BOLTANSKI & C HIAPELLO, supra note 113, at 73–75 (describing this
outsourcing as part of the process of creating “leaner” organizations).
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would take actions that lowered the value of their companies to create a
smooth earnings stream. 122 More than 80% of the respondents stated that they
would decrease spending on advertising, maintenance, and research and
development to meet short-term objectives such as earnings targets.123 This
short-termism feeds competition, undermines cooperation, and promotes
winner-take-all business practices, all of which are not only bad ways to run
a business, but also have distinctly gendered effects. 124 Another study, which
looked at 6,642 companies in a variety of industries during the period from
1986 to 2005, similarly found an emphasis on short-termism: the firms
increased reported earnings, which in turn influenced stock prices, by cutting
support for research and development and marketing, even where such
practices did not advance the firms’ medium- to longer-term interests.125
Within this system, executive compensation has become exponentially
higher and more steeply banked in the upper-management ranks in an effort
to align executive and shareholder interests. 126 The increase in the ratio of
chief executive officer compensation to average worker pay, for example,
went from 20:1 in 1965 to 347:1 in 2016.127 The principal component of
executive compensation takes the form of stock options, which increase in
value with quarterly earnings, which in turn influence share price in publicly
traded companies. 128 Moreover, corporate boards, which have become more

122. John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, F IN.
ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 27, 33.
123. Id. at 31.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 13–14, 121–27; infra text accompanying notes 294–
99, 338–41.
125. Dallas, supra note 119, at 280 (citing Natalie Mizik, The Theory and Practice of Myopic
Management, 47 J. MARKETING RES. 594, 599–601 (2010)).
126. See Biagio Marino, Show Me the Money: The CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule and the
Quest for Effective Executive Compensation Reform, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1355, 1362 (2016)
(discussing the effects of an upward trend in executive compensation since the 1980s); Robert J.
Rhee, Intrafirm Monitoring of Executive Compensation, 69 VAND. L. REV. 695, 697–700 (2016)
(arguing that while shareholders now have a legal right to participate in executive compensation
decisions under Dodd-Frank, corporations should use employees as intrafirm monitors of executive
performance and pay to legitimize compensation and provide the corporate boards with private
information relevant to executive performance). See generally Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg.
50,104, 50,104 (Aug. 18, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240 & 249).
127. Executive Paywatch, AM. FED’N L AB. & CONG. INDUS. ORGS., https://aflcio.org/paywatch
[https://perma.cc/6QDK-4YVJ] (discussing 2016 data); ALYSSA DAVIS & LAWRENCE MISHEL,
ECON. POL’Y INST., CEO PAY CONTINUES TO R ISE AS TYPICAL WORKERS ARE PAID LESS (2014),
http://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay-continues-to-rise/
[https://perma.cc/P222-TLLC]
(representing 1965 data).
128. See generally MICHAEL DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND O THER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO P AY
EXPERIMENT F AILED AND HOW TO F IX IT (2014) (discussing the process underlying increases in
CEO compensation); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. S T. U. L. REV. 673, 704 (2005) (noting that
“stock options are perhaps the best-known contracting technique for linking executive pay and
corporate performance”).
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influential, emphasize share value as a measure of CEO success, 129 while
hedge funds and other activist investors use share value to target what they
perceive to be underperforming firms. 130 The result creates powerful
incentives that separate the interests of CEOs and shareholders from those of
other corporate stakeholders.
Second, this emphasis on the CEO’s need to produce immediate results
contributes to the adoption of merit pay and bonus systems that rank
employees and introduce greater pay variations among employees at
comparable levels of an organization. 131 These incentive systems allow a
CEO to reorient a firm’s priorities,132 rewarding employees who quickly
adopt management aims, even if such objectives are ill-considered or at odds
with the company’s established ethos or ethical standards.133 The incentive
systems may use subjective evaluations that increase management discretion
or reductionist evaluations tied to easily measured factors such as sales or
unit profitability. 134 Perhaps the most notorious of these evaluation systems
is “rank-and-yank,” which was introduced at General Electric by Jack Welch
and is the system at the core of the Microsoft litigation. 135 The “yank” part of

129. See Dallas, supra note 119, at 268 (defining this as “short-termism”).
130. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism
by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 75, 80–81 (2011) (noting that a high percentage of publicly
traded companies experience pressure to increase short-term earnings because of the role of hedge
funds and other activist investors).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 129–33, 326.
132. See, e.g., William K. Black, The Department of Justice “Chases Mice While Lions Roam
the Campsite”: Why the Department Has Failed to Prosecute the Elite Frauds That Drove the
Financial Crisis, 80 UMKC L. REV. 987, 992 (2012) (observing that CEOs control a company’s
compensation systems and “can reserve bonuses for those who ‘get with the program,’ demoralizing
others or persuading them to leave.”); see also Welch, supra note 9 (defending such systems as a
way to encourage employees to define their efforts in terms of management objectives).
133. See Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and
Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 37 (2003) (describing how Enron management used its bonus system to reorient
company behavior in counterproductive and unethical ways).
134. Both, for example, have led to greater gender disparities in doctor’s compensation. Where
reductionist measures are used, such as the number of Medicare procedures billed, male doctors
tend to bill more procedures than female doctors do, in part because male doctors care more about
compensation. Andrew Fitch, Why Women Doctors Make Half of What Men Do: Medicare’s Doctor
Gender Pay Gap, NERDWALLET (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/health/doctorsalary-gender-pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/YK2H-J7VU] (finding that male doctors on average were
paid 88% more in annual Medicare reimbursements than female doctors). Where subjective
evaluations determine salaries, male doctors also fare better than female doctors do. See Louise
Marie Roth, A Doctor’s Worth: Bonus Criteria and the Gender Pay Gap Among American
Physicians, 3 SOC. CURRENTS 3, 3 (2016).
135. Jack Welch, who justified “rank-and-yank” as a way of aligning employee incentives with
firm objectives, is notorious for the use of earnings management to manipulate short-term share
prices. See ROGER F. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT CAPITALISM
CAN LEARN FROM THE NFL 29, 97 (2011) (detailing that during the Jack Welch-era, General
Electric was able to meet or beat earnings forecasts an unbelievable 96% of the time, with earnings
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the system, which seeks to repeatedly cull low-performing employees, has
received the sharpest criticism, and many companies have abandoned it,
although they have retained ranking in some form. 136 Yet, the ranking part of
the system has negative effects even if the company does not seek to fire or
replace employees. Lynne Dallas observes that systems that use rankings to
justify large disparities in compensation tend to produce greater emphasis on
self-interest, higher levels of distrust that undermine teamwork, greater
homogeneity in the selection of corporate management, less managerial
accountability, and more politicized decision-making.137 In short, supposedly
meritocratic bonus systems have been found to replicate many of the
attributes of old boys’ clubs that protect insiders at the expense of
outsiders.138
Third, these changes in corporate orientation alter the qualities that lead
to career advancement. The modern CEO-selection process prizes the
“charismatic” leader, who is seen as having “the power to perform miracles—
to bring a dying company back to life, for instance, or to vanquish much
larger, more powerful foes.”139 As companies place greater confidence in the
external executive market, they also invest less in their own managers and
increase the emphasis on lateral hires at more junior levels as well. 140 The
ability to move, in turn, becomes necessary to upward advancement. 141 And
the ability to move drives up the wages of the mobile and creates incentives
to look out for self-interest rather than invest in the company. 142 This system
from 89% of those quarters hitting analysts’ forecasts to the exact penny). Enron also used the rankand-yank system. See PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 51–
52 (2002).
136. Max Nisen, Why Stack Ranking Is a Terrible Way to Motivate Employees, BUS. INSIDER,
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/stack-ranking-employees-is-a-bad-idea-2013-11
[https://perma.cc/4NRB-7HRL] (observing that while 49% of companies reported that they used
stack ranking systems in 2009, by 2011, only 14% used them). Nisen reports, however, that most
employees are still rated or ranked, just not on a mandatory curve. Id.
137. Dallas, supra note 133, at 37.
138. Although, as Dallas emphasizes, the system often produces a young boys’ club in which
CEOs recruit ambitious new hires who “want to make a lot of money fast.” Dallas, supra note 133,
at 50. The new employees, especially if they have limited experience elsewhere, more readily buy
into shifts in corporate orientation. Id. at 49.
139. Rakesh Khurana, The Curse of the Superstar CEO, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2002, at 60,
62.
140. See RAKESH K HURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE S AVIOR: T HE IRRATIONAL
QUEST FOR C HARISMATIC CEOS 196 (2002) (describing the erosion of institutional commitment to
managers and the increased reliance on search firms for lower-level executives).
141. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (“The
benefits of mobility are not shared equally within the family, and the burdens tend to be borne
disproportionately by women.”); see also text accompanying notes 266–67.
142. See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and
Multitasking, 124 J. POL. ECON. 305, 323 (2016) (explaining that increased competition for talented
agents makes their performance-based pay rise more than proportionately to their marginal product,
thus leading to less long-term investment and diminished prosocial efforts inside firms).
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further redefines the qualities associated with the ideal executive who can
impress in an interview and the process that determines compensation, as a
larger part of overall compensation depends on negotiated salaries or annual
bonuses.143 Moreover, it builds in rewards for those who can have an
immediate impact and then move on to the next position. Loyalty to an
institution no longer matters.144
The financial sector, whose influence has also disproportionately grown
with these changes,145 has shifted toward such norms at least as dramatically
if not more than other companies have. Michael Lewis, for example, in his
1989 book about Salomon Brothers, Liar’s Poker, wrote about the
celebration of the “Big Swinging Dick.”146 He described his well-paid class
of traders, hired right out of Ivy League colleges, as acting “more like
students in a junior high school . . . .” 147 The ethos, as the name big swinging
dick suggests, combined a glorification of cleverness and gamesmanship with
signs of masculinity; 148 serving customer interests was not part of the path
toward advancement. 149 The change came not only with the switch from
partnership to corporate form in Wall Street firms, 150 but with the ability to
create complex, opaque financial products and to profit from them at the
expense of less sophisticated customers. 151 Potential clients, who were often

143. See id. at 310–11 (describing the theory that competition is altering the structure of toplevel compensation toward high-powered incentives); see also BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra
note 113, at 93–95 (observing that acquisition of experience increases “personal capital” and thus
“employability,” but that it also increases opportunism and self-interested behavior).
144. WARTZMAN, supra note 114, passim; see also Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the
Market at Wal-Mart, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 759, 765 (2013) (discussing how Wal-Mart’s relocation
policy is harmful to female employees).
145. See, e.g., William Lazonick, The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: What Has Been
Lost, and How It Can Be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 859–60 (2013) (arguing that
“financialization” of the American corporation has resulted in an organizational failure that eschews
long-term investment in innovation and is complicit in the disappearance of middle-class jobs).
146. MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER 46 (1989).
147. HILL & P AINTER, supra note 13, at 98.
148. Id. at 99; see also Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom Room:
How Wall Street’s Social and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation, 33
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 175, 177 (2010) (describing the trading desk as “a highly competitive and
male-dominated environment where posters of pinup girls and strip club outings were not unheard
of”).
149. See HILL & PAINTER, supra note 13, at 102–03 (documenting what one ex-Goldman Sachs
executive described as the recent deterioration of its client relationships).
150. Claire Hill & Richard W. Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1177–
78 (2010).
151. See HILL & P AINTER, supra note 13, at 19, 85–86, 90 (quoting an ex-Goldman Sachs
executive as saying “[t]he quickest way to make money on Wall Street is to take the most
sophisticated product and try to sell it to the least sophisticated client”).
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at the losing ends of the trades, nonetheless sought to be associated with the
winners of these high-stakes status competitions.152
The changes within professions have been less dramatic, but they are
not immune from the tournament mentality. Law firms have become more
like businesses,153 and differences in doctors’ compensation have also
become more variable. 154
Taken together, these changes create more hierarchical and capricious
compensation systems; no two employees in a company necessarily earn the
same salary, with disparities increasing as one climbs the management
ladder.155 In addition, they often change corporate workplaces that once
prized loyalty and teamwork into competitive contests that pit workers
against each other and turn the executives who emerge from the process into
“hyper-motivated survivors” of the contest-like evaluation process.156 The
system rewards those who put their own interests ahead of the group and who
focus more on immediate financial rewards than on either a service
orientation or the institution’s long-term interests.157 The new system is
responsible for the shift from the pyramid structure of compensation in the
manufacturing age to a more steeply banked system in which those at the top
earn dramatically more than anyone else does. While this new system
arguably disadvantages the majority of workers at the expense of the few, it

152. See id. at 103 (discussing the fact that neither the individual traders nor the bank’s
reputation was necessarily hurt by being associated with this conduct, so long as the behavior was
associated with the “smartest” bankers).
153. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 752 (2010)
(analyzing big law firms as a type of business and advocating for the structuring of these firms’
business model to avoid failure); see also Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional
Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2245, 2263–64 (2010) (observing that the “competitive meritocracy” is
being replaced by a “hypercompetitive ideology” that, compared with its predecessor, disadvantages
women and puts more emphasis on 24/7 client-centered representation, complete loyalty and
devotion to the firm and its clients, and maximizing profit per partner, and less emphasis on
meritocracy, the exercise of professional judgment, and cultivation of professional culture).
154. See Bonnie Darves, Physician Compensation Models: The Basics, the Pros, and the Cons,
NEJM CAREER CTR. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.nejmcareercenter.org/article/physiciancompensation-models-the-basics-the-pros-and-the-cons/
[https://perma.cc/U68Q-8QVL]
(indicating that physician compensation plans now have some type of bonus or incentive
component).
155. See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 26 (chronicling how the most educated women who have
achieved the highest level of professional status experience a more substantial wage gap than those
in lower wage jobs).
156. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 9.
157. See David W. Hart & Jeffery A. Thompson, Untangling Employee Loyalty: A
Psychological Contract Perspective, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 297, 302–03, 306 (2007) (observing that
employee loyalty is harder to come by in companies that do not offer secure employment, income,
and benefits); see also HILL & P AINTER, supra note 13, at 102–03 (describing how Goldman Sachs’s
“proud history of serving clients” has deteriorated in recent years).
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also imperils the gains women have made in the workforce and will
undermine their position even more in the future.
B.

The New Economy and the Gender Wage Gap

The changing workplace has created dramatically greater income
inequality in American society, with increasing concern about the staggering
increases in top salaries, compression at the bottom, and the hollowing out of
the middle class.158 The subject of much less commentary, however, has been
the impact on women. Women have lost ground in the areas of the economy
where incomes have increased most.
Nonetheless, looking at overall measures of the gendered gap in income
would seem to tell a story of progress: the gap has narrowed substantially
over the last half-century. Yet, as a measure of women’s economic standing,
the composite numbers are misleading. While the wage gap has narrowed, it
has done so overwhelmingly at the bottom, in part because of the drop in
blue-collar male wages.159 Since 1990, the gendered wage gap has grown
where it matters most—at the top. In 1990, the gendered gap in wages did
not vary much by education; to the extent that there was a difference, collegegraduate women earned a slightly higher percentage of the male wage than
less educated women.160 Today, that relationship has reversed; the percentage
of the male wage that female college graduates earn has declined, while it has
increased for all other women. 161
This is precisely where there has been the most substantial growth in
income inequality in the United States. Between 2000 and 2014, weekly
wages for the top 10% of the workforce rose by 9.7%, the place where women
had “lost substantial ground,” while falling 3.7% for workers in the lowest
tenth of the earnings distribution, and 3% for those in the lowest quarter.162

158. See Lazonick, supra note 145, at 857–59 (describing U.S. employment trends since the
1990s); see also Noah, supra note 22, at 57 (addressing income inequality more generally).
159. See Derek Thompson, Why the Gender-Pay Gap Is Largest for the Highest-Paying Jobs,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/the-sticky-floorwhy-the-gender-wage-gap-is-lowest-for-the-worst-paying-jobs/383863/ [https://perma.cc/7ZYLNPH2] (graphing women’s earnings as a percentage of men’s earnings for the ten lowest paying
and ten highest paying jobs in the country).
160. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The End of Men or the Rebirth of Class?, 93 B.U. L. REV.
871, 880 (2013).
161. See June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family Law Fails in a
New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 872 (2011) (documenting this shift in the
gendered wage gap).
162. Drew DeSilver, For Most Workers, Real Wages Have Barely Budged for Decades, PEW
RES. CTR. (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/09/for-most-workersreal-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/ [https://perma.cc/5DLB-AR2V].
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The most dramatic changes in income were at the absolute top, 163 the
place where women are the least represented. By 2014, total average CEO
compensation for the largest firms reached $16.3 million. 164 These increases
in compensation between the late 1970s and 2014 constituted an increase of
997%, double the increase in the stock market and the 10.9% growth in
average compensation over the same period. 165 Women’s representation in
these ranks has remained small. Although women constitute almost half of
all workers, they are only 4% of the CEOs of Fortune 500 Companies, 166
“8.1% of the country’s top earners,” and only 14–16% “of corporate
executive officers, law firm equity partners, and senior management in
Silicon Valley.”167 Even if they make it into the CEO ranks, women “earn
46% less than their male counterparts, after adjusting for age and
education.” 168
The financial sector exhibits a similar pattern of disproportionate
increases in compensation and a widening gender gap. In the postwar era,
compensation in the financial sector increased in step with other industries, 169
while between 1982 and 2007 average annual compensation in the financial
sector doubled at a time when compensation in the rest of the economy grew
only modestly. 170 Yet the financial sector shows greater gender disparities
than anywhere else. An analysis of personal financial advisors, for example,
shows that women earn 58.4 cents on the dollar compared to men, a larger

163. See Noah, supra note 22, at 62–63 (describing increases in compensation in the financial
sector and the top executive ranks as the primary sources of income inequality in the country).
164. LAWRENCE MISHEL & ALYSSA D AVIS, TOP CEOS MAKE 300 T IMES MORE THAN
TYPICAL WORKERS (2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/top-ceos-make-300-times-more-thanworkers-pay-growth-surpasses-market-gains-and-the-rest-of-the-0-1-percent/
[https://perma.cc/897B-CFW5]. As with other sectors, the disparities between top firms and others
often exacerbate differences in compensation. See Executive Paywatch, AM. FED’N L AB. & CONG.
INDUS. ORGS., https://aflcio.org/paywatch [https://perma.cc/6QDK-4YVJ] (noting the high CEOto-worker pay ratio).
165. MISHEL & DAVIS, supra note 164.
166. Valentina Zarya, The Percentage of Female CEOs in the Fortune 500 Drops to 4%,
FORTUNE (June 6, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/06/women-ceos-fortune-500-2016/ [https://
perma.cc/U8NP-PMFZ].
167. Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 923 (2016).
168. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 25.
169. June Carbone, Once and Future Financial Crises: How the Hellhound of Wall Street
Sniffed Out Five Forgotten Factors Guaranteed to Produce Fiascos, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1021, 1057
(2012).
170. Id. at 1057–58. Earnings in the top executive ranks of the financial sector increased even
more. “By 2005, executive pay in the financial industry averaged $3.5 million a year, the highest of
any industry.” Id. at 1058. And while financial sector income plummeted in the immediate wake of
the financial crisis, earnings have since rebounded. See Donald Tomaskovic-Devey & Ken-Hou
Lin, Financialization: Causes, Inequality Consequences, and Policy Implications, 18 N.C.
BANKING INST. 167, 175–76 (2013) (documenting U.S. income redistribution into the finance sector
from the 1950s to the 2010s).
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gap than among men when the same measurements are used.171 Another
survey finds similar gaps among insurance agents, security sales agents,
financial managers, and clerks.172 Moreover, as compensation within the
financial sector soared, the representation of women has declined. During the
nineties, women initially won access to key financial jobs through litigation,
but despite increasing numbers of female MBAs, their numbers on Wall
Street dropped after 2000,173 as did their representation in venture capital
firms like Kleiner Perkins. 174
Outside of these top positions, incomes—and gender disparities—have
also steadily risen in the professional and managerial positions that command
the highest salaries—and that tend to be the most competitive. 175 For
example, following financial sector positions, the next-highest disparities
tend to come for marketing and sales managers, who are often paid on
commission, where it is 67%, followed by physicians and surgeons, 64%,
management analysts, 80%, and lawyers, 79%.176
Doctors provide a particularly puzzling example because gender gaps
have grown not only in total income, 177 but also in starting salaries, even after
controlling for education, specialty, and hours worked. 178 As with other
positions, the disparities among doctors tend to be the highest in the most
profitable specialties, such as orthopedic surgery and other surgical
subspecialties.179 Moreover, gender differences are greatest in markets, such
171. Thompson, supra note 159. For more recent figures, see AM. ASS’N UNIV. WOMEN, THE
SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER P AY GAP 18 (Fall 2017 ed.) (showing the financial sector as
still exhibiting the largest gender gaps in compensation).
172. Alexander Eichler, Gender Wage Gap Is Higher on Wall Street than Anywhere Else,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/19/gender-wagegap-wall-street_n_1362878.html [https://perma.cc/VKZ4-NJQE] (citing Frank Bass, Shining Shoes
Best Way Wall Street Women Outearn Men, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2012-03-16/shining-shoes-best-way-wall-street-women-outearn-men [https://
perma.cc/R8YY-F5E9]); see also Jeff Kauflin, The 10 Industries With The Biggest Gender Pay
Gaps, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2016/12/06/the-10industries-with-the-biggest-gender-pay-gaps/#c9d94dd51d4f
[https://perma.cc/K8SY-9B9F]
(noting that finance and insurance have the largest pay gaps of all professions).
173. Eichler, supra note 172.
174. See Giang, supra note 1 (reporting that the number of female decision-makers in venture
capital firms has dropped from 10% in 1999 to 6% in 2014).
175. See Paul Ovenberg & Janet Adamy, What’s Your Pay Gap?, WALL STREET J. (May 17,
2016), http://graphics.wsj.com/gender-pay-gap/ [https://perma.cc/S6JT-7LJY] (documenting
gender pay gaps for 422 professions and categories with data from the U.S. Census Bureau).
176. Id.
177. Indeed, looking at doctors as a group, the gendered wage is worse than for other
professions, with female physicians and surgeons making only 64% of the incomes earned by their
male peers. Id.
178. Anthony T. Lo Sasso et al., The $16,819 Pay Gap for Newly Trained Physicians: The
Unexplained Trend of Men Earning More than Women, 30 HEALTH AFF. 193, 193 (2011).
179. See Anupam B. Jena et al., Sex Differences in Physician Salary in US Public Medical
Schools, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1294, 1294, 1300–01 (2016) (finding, after controlling for
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as Charlotte, North Carolina, that have the highest average levels of physician
pay, replicating the patterns in other industries of the highest gender gaps
existing for the most lucrative jobs. 180 In addition, studies find gender
disparities where compensation is based on subjective evaluations or
reductionist measures of procedures billed. 181
Among lawyers, overall pay has increased since 1990 in accordance
with a double-humped system in which the compensation of top law firm
partners grew substantially while other lawyers saw more modest increases
in salaries.182 While there is a gender wage gap of 22.6% among female and
male lawyers as a whole, 183 among partners in the largest firms there is a 44%
differential in pay. 184 As is true of other highly paid sectors, the gender gap
is highest at the high end of the pay scale.
In light of the increasing gender pay differences in the sectors of the
economy that have contributed the most to growing inequality, the question
is whether antidiscrimination law can address these differences. The answer
involves further examination of the shift to more negative-sum competitions
and individualist employment environments.

various factors, the estimated adjusted salary among men exceeded that of women and was
statistically significant in nine of eighteen specialties and finding surgical subspecialties
demonstrated the largest difference with an absolute adjusted gap of $43,728 in salary).
180. “Researchers found that the average national gender pay gap among survey respondents
was 26.5 percent, or more than $91,000 a year, after controlling for specialty, geography, years of
experience, and reported weekly work hours.” Christina Cauterucci, The Gender Pay Gap in
Medicine Is Abominable. Here’s Where It’s Worst, SLATE (Mar. 26, 2017), http://www
.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2017/04/26/the_gender_pay_gap_in_medicine_is_abominable_here_s_
where_it_s_worst.html [https://perma.cc/YK25-GUGR].
181. By “reductionist,” we mean measures such as procedures billed without controlling for
other considerations, such as whether the procedures were medically indicated or otherwise
appropriate. A. Charlotta Weaver et al., A Matter of Priorities? Exploring the Persistent Gender
Pay Gap in Hospital Medicine, 10 J. HOSP. MED. 486, 487 (2015) (indicating that at least part of
the explanation was that women doctors prioritized pay less than male doctors did). Indeed, the
disparities are particularly large in Medicare reimbursements, where female doctors make half of
what male doctors do, in large part because male doctors, who appear to be more focused on the
bottom line, perform more procedures and see more patients. See Fitch, supra note 134 (reporting
that male doctors saw 60% more patients, performed more services per patient treated, and made
24% more money per patient treated).
182. Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to Law
Practice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL E THICS 601, 610 (2016).
183. Debra Cassens Weiss, Full-Time Female Lawyers Earn 77 Percent of Male Lawyer Pay,
ABA J. (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/pay_gap_is_greatest_in_legal
_occupations/ [https://perma.cc/7PNV-5UTB] (“Median pay for full-time female lawyers was 77.4
percent of the pay earned by their male counterparts, according to data for 2014 released earlier this
month by the U.S. Census Bureau.”).
184. Elizabeth Olson, A 44% Pay Divide for Male and Female Law Partners, Survey Says, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct.
12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/business/
dealbook/female-law-partners-earn-44-less-than-the-men-survey-shows.html?mabReward=CTM
&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&region=CColumn&module=Recommendation&src=rechp&
WT.nav=RecEngine [https://perma.cc/7GT2-NYY3].
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C.

The New System of Negative Competition and Gender
Most analyses of the “glass ceiling” that blocks the movement of women
into upper management positions center on ways to ensure the promotion of
women on the same terms that apply to men.185 Such an approach to gender
discrimination focuses on the seeming neutrality of the more competitive
marketplace, thus placing the structure of those marketplaces outside of the
scope of Title VII law.
Instead, this section shows that the more general forces that produce the
new marketplace—and greater economic inequality—are deeply gendered,
and are thus subject to challenge under Title VII. Yet antidiscrimination
efforts, which decry the gender disparities, have not directly engaged the
validity of the practices associated with greater inequality (winner-take-all
bonus systems, short-termism, and highly competitive workplaces). It is the
separation of the two that intrinsically limits the effectiveness of
antidiscrimination approaches.
This section begins by examining the gendered impact of the shift
toward more competitive workplaces. Second, it explores the impact on the
qualities associated with the winners of such competitions. And third, it
considers the negative evaluation of women in such environments. This
means that women face a triple, not just a double, bind. 186
1. Selection Effects Part I: Gender Differences in Competitive
Environments.—The primary question for purposes of the intersection
between anti-inequality and antidiscrimination law is accounting for the
growth of gender disparities in the highest paid professions. Almost all of the
accounts, whether they view these changes as pernicious or benign, 187
emphasize that as differences in compensation have become more extreme
and competition for top jobs has increased, 188 the increased competition
produces greater gender differences. 189 This section considers why simply

185. See generally S HERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD
(2013) (suggesting strategies for women to advocate for themselves individually in the workplace).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25 (defining the triple bind).
187. See supra notes 14–17 (describing the current gender inequality literature).
188. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 133, at 50, 53 (describing the effect of Enron’s bonus system
in undermining teamwork, increasing the focus on self-interest, and making employees more
competitive toward and distrustful of each other).
189. See, e.g., Marta M. Elvira & Mary E. Graham, Not Just a Formality: Pay System
Formalization and Sex-Related Earnings Effects, 13 ORG. SCI. 601, 601 (2002) (finding that bonuspay systems produce more gender disparities than systems that give greater weight to base pay);
Paul A. Gompers et al., Gender Effects in Venture Capital 5 (May 12, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2445497 [https://perma.cc/
9BX3-W2A2] (observing “that women tend to perform better in firms that have more formal
processes and greater bureaucracy”).
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increasing the level of competition to get, keep, and prosper from these jobs
may have gendered effects.
The conventional explanation for the disproportionate lack of women in
the highest earning sector in the economy is that women are less likely to
apply because of the emphasis on long hours, greater risk, and even
differences in taste for competition. Each of these explanations may have a
degree of plausibility; but each also cloaks the artificial nature of the
competitions that have been created. These competitions often discourage
women from applying not because they involve competition per se, but
because the competitions valorize stereotypically male traits associated with
the promotion of self-interest at the expense of collaboration. 190 The
emphasis on male-defined competition then produces self-reinforcing effects
that create even less supportive environments for women. To the extent that
women accurately perceive that they will not be treated fairly in such
environments—or may not wish to work in such environments even if they
are welcomed—they are that much less likely to apply.
First, when it comes to working longer hours, 191 women, particularly
those with young children, often do not apply. 192 Longer hours certainly
provide part of the answer.193 As the economy has shifted toward more
190. Mary Anne Case provides a particularly effective example by describing how the
stereotypically male definition of the police officer role persists due to valuing counterproductive
traits (aggressiveness, self-assuredness, and reliance on physical strength) in the selection process
despite other policing methods that emphasize different traits (e.g., ability to de-escalate conflict)
being more effective. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 85–94
(1995). Case further notes some of the most effective recommendations for reform came from
recognition of the abuses that led to the Rodney King case, rather than simply consideration of
women’s interests taken in isolation. Id.
191. See generally Marianne Bertrand et al., Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young
Professionals in the Financial and Corporate Sectors, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., July 2010, at
228, 230 (finding differences in weekly hours worked between men and women with MBAs to be
a proximate factor in gender wage gaps).
192. Cordelia Fine provides the results of one psychological survey:
[A survey of] more than eight hundred managers at a major consultancy firm . . . found
that women on average were less willing than men to make sacrifices for their career,
and take career risks in order to get ahead. Closer examination revealed that this was
because women tended to perceive less benefit in taking risks and making sacrifices.
But this was not because they were simply less ambitious. Rather, they had lower
expectations of success, fewer role models, less support, and less confidence that their
organization was a meritocracy.
FINE, supra note 25, at 121.
193. More competitive environments which increase the emphasis on long or inflexible hours
disadvantage women more than men. In some cases, such as women’s decisions to select pharmacy
as a profession, hours are a decisive factor controlling for other measures. See, e.g., Claudia Goldin
& Lawrence F. Katz, The Most Egalitarian of All Professions: Pharmacy and the Evolution of a
Family-Friendly Occupation 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18410,
2012) (concluding that the decline of independent pharmacies in place of large national chains and
hospitals has resulted in the more egalitarian, family-friendly pharmacy profession). In many cases,
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winner-take-all compensation systems, part of the competition has taken the
form of hours—and the longer the hours, the more women tend to drop out
of the competition. 194 Hours have in fact increased, and they have increased
most at the top of the income ladder. 195 During the Great Compression from
the ’40s through the ’70s, blue-collar workers and white-collar workers
worked about the same number of hours. 196 Today, the highest earning
employees work much longer hours than the average worker does. 197 Women
still bear disproportionate responsibility for child care,198 and when women’s
hours exceed forty-five a week, it undermines their relationships. 199 Elite men
continue to be more likely to earn more than their wives to a greater degree
than other working couples, increasing the pressure on high-income wives to
cut back.200 These are, of course, so much more than just private choices.
Indeed, Wisconsin repealed its Equal Pay Act, with a state senator who
backed the measure insisting that men and women have different goals in life
and money “is more important for men” while women refuse to work fifty or
sixty hours a week because of their greater involvement in childrearing. 201

though, long hours become a product of competition itself rather than an inevitable job
characteristic. See Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Carolyn Buck Luce, Extreme Jobs: The Dangerous Allure
of the 70-Hour Workweek, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at 49, 52–53 (citing “competitive
pressures” as one of the motivations for working high hours).
194. See Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Transitions: Career and Family Life Cycles of
the Educational Elite, AM. ECON. REV., Jan. 2008, at 363, 367 (noting the negative relationship
between a woman’s income and number of children is entirely accounted for by the number of hours
worked); see also Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Cost of Workplace Flexibility for HighPowered Professionals, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & S OC. SCI., Nov. 2011, at 45, 49 (noting that an
eighteen-month break during fifteen years of working results in decreased earnings of 41% for
MBAs).
195. See Peter Kuhn & Fernando Lozano, The Expanding Workweek? Understanding Trends
in Long Work Hours Among U.S. Men, 1979-2004 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 11895, 2005) (finding that between 1979 and 2004, the frequency of long work hours
increased by 11.7% among the top quintile of wage earners, but fell by 8.4% for the lowest quintile).
196. Id. at 2.
197. Id. at 5, 34.
198. See Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1091, 1111–13
(2014) (documenting the effects of motherhood on the professional lives of women with MBAs);
Valentina Zarya, Working Long Hours Is Way Worse for Women’s Health than for Men’s, FORTUNE
(June 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/17/women-health-work/ [https://perma.cc/V48BAMXP] (positing that women may experience greater health consequences than men for working
longer hours because of the disproportionate burden of childcare).
199. PAUL R. AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING
104 (2009).
200. JUNE CARBONE & N AOMI C AHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING
THE AMERICAN F AMILY 98 (2014) (noting that in dual-earner families in the bottom quintile of
wages the wife earns more than the husband in 70% of marriages, while in the top 20%, the wife
earns more than the husband in only 34% of marriages).
201. JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, NINE TO F IVE: HOW GENDER, SEX, AND SEXUALITY CONTINUES
TO DEFINE THE AMERICAN W ORKPLACE 299 (2016).
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An actual job-based need to work longer hours, however, cannot provide
the entire answer for increasing gender disparities in top positions. For one
thing, gender disparities persist even when researchers examined only white
college graduates with fifteen years of experience who worked fulltime. 202
The long hours themselves may reflect more competitive environments rather
than increased productivity. 203 In addition, managers cannot necessarily tell
whether workers who claim to work longer hours are in fact doing so, and
one study found that men were three times more likely than women to ease
up on hours without having it effect their performance reviews; in short, they
were more likely to “pass” as workaholics.204 Consequently, while long hours
do affect gender disparities, the longer hours may reflect increased
competition as much as, if not more than, workplace needs.
Numerous management studies focus on other gender differences in
corporate advancement. Some suggest, for example, that women are more
risk averse than men or that they lack the confidence (some would say hubris)
that comes from success. 205 These studies, however, have been subject to
withering criticism206 and do not necessarily take context into account. Male
and female entrepreneurs and managers, for example, do not vary in risk
propensities or in their success in managing risk. 207
Many social science explanations focus on the taste for competition
itself. In fact, almost all studies show that higher pay tied to performance
measures and want ads emphasizing competitive environments increase the

202. See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s:
Slowing Convergence, 60 INDUS. & L AB. REL. REV. 45, 61–62 (2006) (discussing the unexplained
gender pay gap among white college graduates with fifteen years of experience working full time);
see also Goldin, supra note 198, at 1096 (presenting data from a similar sample of full-time, collegegraduate, men and women with 16-plus years of schooling).
203. See Sarah Green Carmichael, The Research Is Clear: Long Hours Backfire for People and
for Companies, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 19, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/08/the-research-is-clearlong-hours-backfire-for-people-and-for-companies [https://perma.cc/W2YW-MG7E] (discussing
research that shows that multiple days of overwork results in diminished productivity for the vast
majority of workers); Wald, supra note 153, at 2271–72 (explaining the emphasis on long hours at
law firms as the product of an ideological shift).
204. Neil Irwin, How Some Men Fake an 80-Hour Workweek, and Why It Matters, N.Y. TIMES:
THE UPSHOT (May 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/upshot/how-some-men-fake-an80-hour-workweek-and-why-it-matters.html [https://perma.cc/5LHN-K3YR] (citing Erin Reid,
Embracing, Passing, Revealing, and the Ideal Worker Image: How People Navigate Expected and
Experienced Professional Identities, 26 ORG. SCI. 997 (2015)).
205. Blau & Kahn, supra note 98, at 42–44 (surveying literature on confidence and risk
aversion).
206. See generally JULIE A. NELSON, GENDER AND R ISK-T AKING: ECONOMICS, EVIDENCE,
AND W HY THE ANSWER MATTERS (2017) (criticizing the academic literature on “gender and risk,”
especially the economic literature, as plagued by confirmation bias and publication bias).
207. Blau & Kahn, supra note 98, at 42–43 (citing Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender
Differences in Preferences, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 448 (2009)).
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percentage of men who apply. 208 Laboratory studies using a general
population indicate that the effect of competition on gender-based
preferences may be independent of the individual’s orientation toward risk
or confidence in her performance. 209 For example, when given a choice
between performing a task on a non-competitive, piece-rate basis versus in a
contest, 73% of the men selected the contest, while only 35% of the women
did so.210 Yet, these studies do not necessarily take the level and type of
competition into account. For example, some studies distinguish between
“hypercompetitives,” who strive for domination and control over others,
versus “personal development competitors,” who are concerned with the
feelings and welfare of others. 211
Nonetheless, these differences in preferences, whatever their sources,
can affect the gender composition of workplaces. Advertising that
emphasizes competitive traits, for example, tends to increase the percentage
of male applicants,212 and the greater percentage of men may make the
environments less attractive to women for reasons that go beyond a taste for
competition.213 Some workplaces may deliberately manipulate the perception
of competitiveness to increase employee insecurity and alignment with
company objectives; other positions, such as those involved with commission

208. Id. at 36–38, 38 n.60 (indicating that controlling for differences in attitudes toward
competition among business students accounted for part of the gendered wage gap); id. at 41
(describing study that found that “the more heavily the compensation package tilted towards
rewarding the individual’s performance relative to a coworker’s performance, the more the
applicant pool shifted to being more male dominated”).
209. Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men
Compete Too Much?, 122 Q. J. ECON. 1067, 1078, 1097–98 (2007); see also Jeffrey Flory et al., Do
Competitive Workplaces Deter Female Workers? A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment on Job
Entry Decisions, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 122, 124 (2015) (indicating the gender gap in applications
more than doubles when a large fraction of the wage (50%) depends on relative performance,
reflecting greater female than male aversion to such environments).
210. Deborah M. Weiss, All Work Cultures Discriminate, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 247,
264 (2013) (citing Niederle & Vesterlund, supra note 209, at 1078, 1097).
211. Richard M. Ryckman et al., Values of Hypercompetitive and Personal Development
Competitive Individuals, 69 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 271, 280 (1997).
212. See, e.g., Flory et al., supra note 209, at 124, 146 (concluding that gender differences in
preferences over uncertainty and potentially competition per se were the most likely explanations
for applicant composition).
213. Danielle Gaucher et al., Evidence that Gendered Wording in Job Advertisements Exists
and Sustains Gender Inequality, 101 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 116–18 (2011)
(finding that advertisements with highly masculine wording received a larger share of male
applicants with women reporting that they found these jobs less appealing and concluding that this
result was mediated by feelings of “belongingness”).
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sales, may have long been designed in such terms. 214 Both tend to result in
fewer women applying. 215
In short, these “choices” by women not to engage in competition or
apply for particular jobs are choices made within particular contexts.
Creating bonus systems with large wage disparities tends to attract not only
those more drawn to money, but workers who are less likely to be supportive
of colleagues.216 Employers who emphasize the competitive nature of such
positions can expect to attract more men than women, 217 but they are also
signaling that they will tolerate certain types of behavior that may
disadvantage women, such as in-group favoritism or lack of mentoring. 218
The emphasis on long hours then challenges women who make choices under
the constraints of familial responsibilities (which in turn become employerenforced stereotypes). 219 Moreover, these workplaces will “crowd out”
values, such as concern for others or adherence to ethical principles, that
many women (and men) might prefer. 220
Accordingly, these are choices that are steered by the ways employers
structure221 and advertise222 jobs, and choices made when women know their

214. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (noting that
there was a lack of interest from women for commission sales positions at Sears based on the number
of women who rejected these positions when offered), aff’d, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
215. These studies further indicate that an emphasis on reductionist monetary incentives, as
opposed to other values such as teamwork or customer satisfaction, are also more likely to appeal
to men than to women. See generally Francine Blau & Lawrence Kahn, The Gender Pay Gap: Have
Women Gone as Far as They Can?, 21 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 7 (2007) (finding that men place
greater emphasis on money and competition within positions); Nicole M. Fortin, The Gender Wage
Gap Among Young Adults in the United States: The Importance of Money Versus People, 43 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 884 (2008) (indicating that men’s greater emphasis on money is a factor exacerbating
the wage gap).
216. Dallas, supra note 133, at 37.
217. See Claire Cain Miller, Job Listings that Are Too ‘Feminine’ for Men, N.Y. TIMES: T HE
UPSHOT (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/upshot/job-disconnect-maleapplicants-feminine-language.html [https://perma.cc/Q2VJ-94HY] (discussing how job listings
with feminine language attract women and deter men); Emily Peck, High-Paying Job Listings Are
Written to Attract Men, Study Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2017),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/job-listings-study_us_58c990b7e4b0be71dcf100f7?95yb0fg
u253eah5mi& [https://perma.cc/3MZD-TF7H] (explaining how high-paying job listings use
language that attracts male candidates).
218. See Dallas, supra note 133, at 37 (describing Enron’s ultra-competitive workplace as
incentivizing employees to spend significant time “buttering up” superiors at the local Starbucks).
219. Schoenbaum, supra note 144, at 778–79 (arguing that employers that act on sex
stereotypes violate Title VII and entrench such stereotypes).
220. Stout, supra note 12, at 529 (observing that pay-for-performance rules crowd out “concern
for others’ welfare and for ethical rules, making the assumption of selfish opportunism a selffulfilling prophecy”).
221. Schultz, supra note 72, at 1058.
222. Miller, supra note 217; Peck, supra note 217.
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actions will be viewed differently than men’s.223 The result is a set of cascade
effects. CEOs may make workplaces more competitive as a way to achieve
short-term goals. Doing so tends to attract more men than women. The shift
in workplace composition can then have reinforcing effects, defining the
nature of the competition in stereotypical male terms and, as we will show
below, accurately persuading women that they will be less likely to succeed.
2. Selection Effects Part II: The Redefinition of the Company “Man.”—
The change from career ladders and the “company man” to competitive
contests involves a shift from technocratic managers to “leaders.”224 A large
management literature describes the importance of assertive executives who
have confidence in their vision for a company, the ability to inspire others,
and the determination to implement their vision no matter what obstacles get
in the way. 225 This same literature, however, recognizes that leaders who
possess such traits are also likely to suffer from hubris, lack of empathy, and
the willingness to cut corners.226 Indeed, Larry Ribstein described the
tournament survivors as “Machiavellian, narcissistic, prevaricating,
pathologically optimistic, free from self-doubt and moral distractions, willing
to take great risk as the company moves up and to lie when things turn

223. Dallas, supra note 133, at 37; see also Marc R. Poirier, Gender Stereotypes at Work, 65
BROOK. L. REV. 1073, 1082 (discussing the suggestion that women combat workplace
discrimination by conforming their behavior to gender stereotypes).
224. See Khurana, supra note 139, at 69 (describing the shift away from the typical
“organizational man” senior manager who worked his way up the ranks toward charismatic CEOs
who are typically either entrepreneurial founders or are brought into the company from the outside).
225. And the literature describes those most likely to display such traits as narcissists. See, e.g.,
Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, the Inevitable Cons, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan. 2004, at 92, 94 (arguing that narcissism is overall a plus in business leadership, as it
contributes to the ability to “push through the massive transformations” and to supply the charm
necessary to win over the masses); Charles A. O’Reilly III et al., Narcissistic CEOs and Executive
Compensation, 25 LEADERSHIP Q. 218, 218 (2013) (describing narcissists as more likely to be
“inspirational, succeed in situations that call for change, and be a force for creativity”).
226. See, e.g., James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 475 n.130 (2004) (“U.S. companies place too much emphasis on
the possession of such traits as optimism and control in top executives, when in fact those exhibiting
these traits have severe forms of cognitive biases, which are disastrous for decision making because
they lead individuals to take action uncritically.”); O’Reilly et al., supra note 225, at 218 (describing
narcissistic leaders as “more likely to violate integrity standards, have unhappy employees and
create destructive workplaces, and inhibit the exchange of information within organizations”
(citations omitted)); Paredes, supra note 128, at 675 (positing that CEOs that suffer from
overconfidence may be more prone to believe they have more control over results than they actually
possess).
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bad.”227 Like Ribstein, both management supporters and their critics label
this collection of traits “narcissistic”228—and as stereotypically male. 229
What these changes in both finance and upper management do is place
an emphasis on stereotypically male leadership traits, defining the ideal traits
in gendered terms. The result rewards those perceived to possess such traits
and minimizes the downside associated with them. 230 This creates a set of
reinforcing effects that aggravates gender disparities.
First, leadership has been defined in terms of traits such as energy,
dominance, self-confidence, and charisma—traits that are associated with
narcissism, and narcissists are both more likely to apply for and be selected
for such positions. 231
Second, men are more likely to be identified with such traits. 232
Psychological studies show that while both men and women display such
traits, men do so to a much greater degree than women. 233 Moreover, in
looking only at narcissists, researchers found that men were more likely than
women to desire power and to be attracted to positions that promised money,
status, and authority. Indeed, the single largest gender difference the
researchers found among those they classified as narcissists was the

227. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 9; see also O’Reilly et al., supra note 225, at 219 (noting the
increasing evidence that narcissistic individuals often become leaders).
228. See, e.g., Maccoby, supra note 225, at 93–94 (describing traits common to narcissists and
providing examples of narcissistic leaders from history).
229. See Emily Grijalva et al., Gender Differences in Narcissism: A Meta-Analytic Review, 141
PSYCHOL. BULL. 261, 264 (2015) (surveying the relevant literature and concluding that societal
pressure that occurs in response to violations of gender norms results in women suppressing displays
of narcissism more than men, because it is seen as more socially acceptable for men to behave as
narcissists). Ann McGinley also emphasizes the normalization of male behavior within the
workplace that involves “competitive efforts between men to establish superior standing and/or
resources.” Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII,
9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 442 (2000).
230. Mary Anne Case emphasizes that this is true even where stereotypically masculine traits
are associated with worse performance and greater exposure to liability for the employer. Case,
supra note 190, at 86–87 (documenting this overvaluation of masculine traits in the context of
policing).
231. See, e.g., O’Reilly et al., supra note 225, at 219–20 (indicating that leadership traits, such
as energy, dominance, self-confidence, and charisma, are associated with narcissism and that
narcissists, especially on first impression, are therefore characterized by others (including
interviewers, business journalists, and other leaders) as having the requisite characteristics to be an
effective leader). “In a meta-analysis of 187 studies of individual differences proposed to be relevant
to effective leadership, . . . seven traits were reliably and significantly associated with leader
effectiveness . . . all of which are characteristics associated with narcissism.” Id. at 220.
232. Grijalva et al., supra note 229, at 262, 280 (coming to this conclusion after reviewing
31 years of narcissism research with over 355 independent samples and 470,846 participants).
233. Id. Indeed the term “narcissism” is often associated with gender-stereotyped behavior such
as “physical expressions of anger, a strong need for achievement, and an authoritative leadership
style . . . .” ANNIKA LORENZ, ACQUISITION VS. ALLIANCE: T HE IMPACT OF HUBRIS ON
GOVERNANCE C HOICE 25 (2011).
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willingness to demand greater rewards for themselves and to use greater
status to exploit others. 234
Third, the selection of top management for their narcissistic qualities is
also selection for those who will be more inclined to see compensation as a
measure of merit, to feel that the compensation they receive is justified, and
to use whatever tactics they have at their disposal to increase their leverage
in negotiations.235 A study of tech firms found that the more narcissistic
CEOs—rated in accordance with an employee evaluation of personality
traits—received “more total direct compensation (salary, bonus, and stock
options), have more money in their total shareholdings, and have larger
discrepancies between their own (higher) compensation and the other
members of their team.” 236
In short, the selection for narcissistic traits favors men, who are more
likely than women to desire power; to be attracted to positions that promise
money, status, and authority; to be willing to demand greater rewards for
themselves; and to use greater status to exploit others.
3. Selection Effect Part III: Gender and “Sharp Elbows.”237—While
the valorization of narcissistic traits often leads to the willingness to overlook
many of its negative traits, women do not benefit to the same degree from the
expression of these traits nor do they escape scrutiny to the same extent as
men. Women also do not receive as much benefit as they might otherwise
from stereotypically female management traits, which may pay off for
companies in different—or better—ways.
The antidiscrimination literature has long shown that women are in a
double bind with respect to traditionally masculine and aggressive tactics. If
women do display “elbows” (as did Ellen Pao), they are judged harshly for

234. Grijalva found that the largest gender differences involved men’s greater willingness “to
exploit others and to believe that they themselves are special and therefore entitled to privileges.”
Grijalva et al., supra note 229, at 280. For examples of the willingness to exploit others in the
financial sector, see HILL & P AINTER, supra note 13, at 123–24 (2015). This may go beyond
narcissism to psychopathy. See Tom Loftus, What Your CEO Is Reading: My CEO, My Psychopath;
Hwy. 101 Road Rage; Reengineering for Women in Tech, WALL S TREET J. (Mar. 17, 2017),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2017/03/17/what-your-ceo-is-reading-my-ceo-my-psychopath-hwy-101road-rage-rengineering-for-women-in-tech/ [https://perma.cc/RK5T-6MMB] (“Recent studies
show that four to eight percent of high-level executives are psychopaths, compared to just 1% of
the population.”).
235. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 128, at 679 (describing those who see high rates of
compensation as indication of professional success or personal self-worth as also likely to see the
actions that produce the compensation as self-validating); see also H ILL & PAINTER, supra note 13,
at 116 (describing the crowding-out effect in bankers).
236. O’Reilly et al., supra note 225, at 218.
237. “#ambitious #aggressive #pushy #competitive #cutthroat #disregardful #tenacious.” Sharp
Elbows, URBAN D ICTIONARY (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term
=Sharp%20Elbow [https://perma.cc/Q4HJ-FFNJ].
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not conforming to gender stereotypes, but if they do not, they may be viewed
as lacking leadership potential.238 The association of more positive
narcissistic traits such as “motivation to lead, desire for authority, and selfperceived leadership ability” with men tends to reinforce what may be
subconscious gender stereotypes.239 At the same time, women tend to be
criticized for deviation from expected feminine roles, even when they display
the more positive traits,240 and punished more severely than men for having
negative traits associated with narcissism, such as self-entitlement and
willingness to exploit others. 241 Women at Amazon, for example, attributed
the lack of a single woman on the company’s top leadership team to its
competitive evaluation system. Sounding much like Ellen Pao, they believed
that they could lose out on promotions because of intangible criteria like the
failure to “earn trust” or disagreeing with colleagues. 242 “Being too forceful,
they said, can be particularly hazardous for women in the workplace.” 243
This traditional double bind further influences the negotiations that have
become a much greater factor in determining higher end salaries. If women
fail to negotiate or to press hard in negotiations, they fall behind in salaries
with potentially career-long consequences. Yet employers are also more
likely to view women as negotiating over-aggressively, especially in
238. When women defy gender role expectations, they face numerous repercussions in the
workplace. Emily A. Leskinen et al., Gender Stereotyping and Harassment: A “Catch-22” for
Women in the Workplace, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 192, 192 (2015) (finding that women that
took on stereotypically masculine behavior experienced a greater risk of harassment). See DOUGLAS
M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE T ABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND L AW KEEP WOMEN
OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 161 (2007) (arguing that women starting to climb the corporate ladder
are actually “walking a tightrope” because they must be sufficiently aggressive to excel, but not
overly aggressive because they will be perceived as pushy); Hannah Riley Bowles et al., Social
Incentives for Gender Differences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does
Hurt to Ask, 103 ORG. BEHAV. & H UM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 95 (2007) (finding that both male
and female evaluators penalized women who negotiated for more compensation because “they
appeared less nice and more demanding”). Also see the discussion of Ellen Pao’s lawsuit, supra
notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
239. For a summary of the literature on the mutually reinforcing effects of such stereotypes, see
McGinley, supra note 229, at 441 (describing the way men frame women “as lacking legitimacy to
hold powerful positions”).
240. Id. at 436–39 (describing how women are treated more negatively when they demonstrate
leadership skills).
241. Grijalva et al., supra note 229, at 264 (collecting research supporting this punishment
defined as the “dominance penalty” for women). McGinley also emphasizes the normalization of
male behavior within the workplace that involves “competitive efforts between men to establish
superior standing and/or resources.” McGinley, supra note 229, at 442. These behaviors include
vying for attention, self-promotion, efforts to control or dominate others, and taking credit for the
work of others. Id.
242. Indeed, Dallas, supra note 133, at 36–37, observes that competitive evaluation systems
create incentives to undermine employees perceived as untrustworthy.
243. Jodi Kantor & David Streitfeld, Inside Amazon: Wrestling Big Ideas in a Bruising
Workplace, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/technology/insideamazon-wrestling-big-ideas-in-a-bruising-workplace.html [https://perma.cc/AFV8-QFNV].
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negotiations without clear standards for the results. 244 And even when women
do negotiate at the same rate as men, they are less likely to receive raises or
promotions.245
In industries that reward taking risks by breaking the rules and hoping
to get away with it, the double bind may be particularly pernicious. For
example, a study of the financial industry demonstrates that misconduct is
prevalent: “roughly one in thirteen financial advisers in the U.S. has a record
of misconduct.”246 Gender differences in the misconduct are rife. Male
advisors are more than three times as likely to engage in misconduct, and
more than twice as likely to be repeat offenders, than female advisors. Male
advisors commit offenses that turn out to be 20% more costly for firms. 247
Once misconduct is reported, female advisors are 20% more likely to lose
their jobs and 30% less likely to find new ones compared to male advisors.248
These patterns correspond with the representation of women in senior
management; “firms in which males comprise a greater percentage of
executives/owners are more likely to punish female advisers more severely
and hire fewer females with a record of past misconduct.”249 In an industry
in which misconduct charges are frequent and risk-taking includes a
willingness to break the rules, the stakes for women in getting caught are
substantially greater. 250

244. See, e.g., Benjamin Artz et al., Do Women Ask? 3 (Warwick Econ. Research Papers,
Working Paper No. 1127, 2016) (explaining that, contrary to other research, women ask for higher
salaries, but do not receive them); Blau & Kahn, supra note 98, at 40 (summarizing the literature
on gender differences in negotiation); Laura Cohn, Women Ask for Raises as Much as Men—but
Get Them Less Often, FORTUNE (Sept. 6, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/06/women-men-salarynegotiations/ [https://perma.cc/8P79-V6BM] (reporting on a study of Australian workplaces that
found that women asked for pay raises as often as men, but were less likely to receive them).
245. Artz et al., supra note 244, at 11–13; Daniel Victor, Research Suggests Women Are Asking
for Raises, but Men Get Them More, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
09/07/business/research-suggests-women-are-asking-for-raises-but-men-get-them-more.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/GX6P-K4EK].
246. Mark Egan et al., When Harry Fired Sally: The Double Standard in Punishing Misconduct
2 (Mar. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available on the Social Science Research Network
website), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2931940 [https://perma.cc/3PM6-RGMX].
247. Id. at 3.
248. Id. at 12, 30. The study observes further that part of the reason for the discrepancy is the
sources of the complaints. For the men, customers initiate 55% of the misconduct complaints
compared to 28% by their employers. For the women, employer-initiated instances of misconduct
are almost as common as customer-initiated complaints (41% versus 44%). Id. at 4. These findings
are consistent with the study’s finding that firms with more women owners and managers reduce
the gender disparities. Id. at 4–5.
249. Id. at 30.
250. Ben Steverman, Proof Wall Street Is Still a Boys’ Club: Financial Advisory Firms Are Far
More Lenient with Men Who Break the Rules, a New Study Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-14/proof-wall-street-is-still-a-boys-club
[https://perma.cc/Z3CL-3STW] (citing Egan et al., supra note 246).
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Given these discriminatory practices, it is hardly surprising that fewer
women apply to these positions. What some men may perceive as an
opportunity to thrive in a competitive environment, many women may see as
a “heads I win, tails you lose” game in which they may be less likely to enjoy
the benefits of outsized risks, but more likely to experience their negative
consequences.251
***
Large companies today rely heavily on pay-for-performance systems,
with competitive evaluations that rank employees. 252 Managers often
introduce such systems to shake up an organization, reorient it toward new
management objectives, or prepare for layoffs. 253 The systems, even when
they strive to be objective, are subject to favoritism and gamesmanship. 254
Such workplaces encourage “unethical behavior, because some individuals
are willing to pay to improve their rank by sabotaging others’ work or by
increasing artificially their own relative performance.” 255 And there is no
evidence they improve performance. Pay-for-performance systems remain
entrenched in large companies, partly because competition, rankings, and
bonuses are standard management norms256 and partly because the systems

251. These practices involve huge risks of a predictable nature. See, e.g., William W. Bratton,
Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1360 (2002) (describing
Enron’s pressure to maximize shareholder value and its culture of winning, together creating an
environment that encouraged “risk-prone decision making”).
252. Enron, for example, used the “rank-and-yank” performance management system initially
developed at GE to rank their employees and then terminate the bottom 15%. This created an
uncomfortably competitive corporate ethos that made workers rationalize their illegal conduct as
successful business practices. See, e.g., PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT
WRONG AT ENRON 51–52 (2002) (describing the pitfalls of Enron’s “rank-and-yank” performance
management system); see also Nancy B. Rapoport, “Nudging” Better Lawyer Behavior: Using
Default Rules and Incentives to Change Behavior in Law Firms, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. &
ETHICS 42, 44 n.2 (2014) (“Want people to turn on their colleagues rather than encourage
teamwork? Use a ‘rank and yank’ system that routinely drops the bottom 10% of high achievers off
the payroll.”).
253. Steve Bates, Forced Rankling, HR MAG. (June 1, 2003), https://www.shrm.org/hrtoday/news/hr-magazine/pages/0603bates.aspx [https://perma.cc/E5YR-J7BQ].
254. Id.
255. Gary Charness et al., The Dark Side of Competition for Status, 60 MGMT. SCI. 38, 41
(2014).
256. See, e.g., Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 89
(1999) (observing seemingly rational individuals “might repeatedly ignore their own inclinations,
preferring instead to emulate their predecessors. More specifically, the cascades literature posits
that strategic actors may rationally prefer emulation, presuming (frequently incorrectly) that their
own information is unreliable measured against the stock of that revealed from their predecessors’
actions”). For an example of this in the sex-stereotyping literature, see Case, supra note 190, at 86–
87, describing the report of a commission examining police practices:
The Commission reported that while female officers’ greater tendency to manifest
feminine and avoid masculine behaviors actually caused them to outperform male
officers, the stereotypical expectation of male officers that policing called for
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deliver short-term pay-offs to ambitious CEOs. 257 Even if a growing literature
documents the long-term disadvantages of these practices, companies
focused on the short term may have little incentive to change.
At the same time, the emphasis on individual rather than institutional
advancement often crowds out other values 258 and undermines the
importance of what women do well. Stereotypically female leadership styles
(whether implemented by men or women) are more associated with
transformational approaches that take group cohesion into account rather
than transactional approaches that focus only on the bottom line, and the
management literature finds that such leadership delivers more successful
results.259 Yet these qualities are less rewarded in the competitive
environments, such as those in tech and finance, that offer the highest rates
of compensation.
Further compounding these results is the fact that women are often less
geographically mobile than men and thus more likely to invest in job-specific
traits rather than preparation for the next move. 260 And modern workplaces,

masculine traits and that female officers lacked these traits caused male officers
systematically to underrate the female officers’ performance.
257. See Dallas, supra note 133, at 37–38 n.222 (noting tradeoffs between short-term objectives
and long-term effects).
258. HILL & PAINTER, supra note 13, at 116. Studies of bankers, who are part of an industry
associated with money, indicate that their identity as bankers make them more likely to cheat in
research experiments. Id. at 115. Women, in contrast, tend to be generally less tolerant of illegal or
unethical behavior, though woman managers in institutions in which such behavior is normalized
exhibit fewer differences than other workers. See ALICE H. EAGLY & L INDA L. CARLI, T HROUGH
THE L ABYRINTH: T HE TRUTH ABOUT HOW WOMEN BECOME LEADERS 46 (2007) (indicating that
women are less tolerant than men of unscrupulous negotiating tactics such as misrepresenting facts
or promising something without planning to keep the promise).
259. See Alice H. Eagly, Women as Leaders: Leadership Style vs. Leaders’ Values and
Attitudes, Harvard Business School Research Symposium, Gender & Work: Challenging
Conventional Wisdom (2013), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/conferences/2013-w50-researchsymposium/Documents/eagly.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCJ9-G53Z] (describing meta-data analysis
showing that female managers are more transformational than male managers); Do Women Make
Better Bosses?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2009), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/
08/02/do-women-make-better-bosses/?_r=0#alice [https://perma.cc/Z53P-EXSF] (illustrating
characteristics of female managers that can make them more effective leaders than men); Claire
Shipman & Katty Kay, Women Will Rule Business, TIME (May 14, 2009), http://content
.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1898024_1898023_1898078,00.html
[https://
perma.cc/GBU7-MGJF] (describing the female management style as one of the factors leading to
more productive and efficient businesses).
260. See, e.g., Karen S. Lyness & Donna E. Thompson, Climbing the Corporate Ladder: Do
Female and Male Executives Follow the Same Route?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 86, 88 (2000)
(explaining that women may have limited geographic mobility because some employers hold
stereotypical views that women have dual-careers or are constrained by familial obligations);
Audrey J. Murrell, Irene Hanson Frieze & Josephine E. Olson, Mobility Strategies and Career
Outcomes: A Longitudinal Study of MBAs, 49 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 324, 324–25 (1996) (noting
the prevailing view among new college graduates that career advancement involves movement from
company to company).
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with their emphasis on landing rising stars rather than on investing in their
own, provide greater rewards for those willing to move, both within
institutions and to new positions elsewhere. 261
Overall, these shifts in corporate culture have deeply gendered
effects.262 Qualities such as the emphasis on competition rather than
cooperation, individual rather than group interests, and short-term rather than
longer term or more holistic aims correspond to well-documented gender
disparities.263 The more sophisticated studies show that the disparities tend to
be less about capacity and performance, and more about stereotypical
assumptions about leadership. 264 The “tournament” tends to attract those
most “willing to take great risk as the company moves up and to lie when
things turn bad . . . .” 265 The fact that the characteristics associated with these
positions tend to be gendered ones further encourages stereotyped
evaluations of employee performance, 266 with reinforcing effects as women
become even less likely to apply or to succeed if they are hired.
Antidiscrimination law, in its current incarnation, is ill-equipped to deal
with these background business incentives that promote inequality.
III. Restructuring Antidiscrimination Law
The history of antidiscrimination law shows that it sought to combat not
just individual instances of discrimination, but also structural factors that had
created white-male-only “good” jobs and segregated “bad” jobs dominated
by African Americans, women, or other minorities. In doing so,
antidiscrimination law both depended on earlier equality-enhancing

261. Flory et al., supra note 209, at 154–55. Note, for example, that even in low-level positions,
the great majority of workers receive evaluations and whether they are able to apply for promotions
or move within an organization often depends on those evaluations.
262. See supra subpart II(C).
263. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 252.
264. Managers with a more stereotypically female approach, whether they are men or women,
often do better than narcissists. See Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Why Do So Many Incompetent Men
Become Leaders?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 22, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/08/why-do-so-manyincompetent-men [https://perma.cc/S5ED-V4NJ] (summarizing research literature on gender
differences in selection and performance).
265. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 9.
266. See BRANSON, supra note 238, at 68 (describing how women starting to climb the
corporate ladder are actually walking a proverbial tightrope because they must be sufficiently
aggressive to excel, but not overly aggressive because they will be perceived as pushy); Bowles et
al., supra note 238, at 95 (finding that both male and female evaluators penalized women who
negotiated for more compensation because “they appeared less nice and more demanding”); see
also Ben DiPietro, Survey Roundup: Women Take Step Back in Board Representation, WALL
STREET J. (June 23, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2017/06/23/survey-roundupwomen-take-step-back-in-board-representation/ [https://perma.cc/T9U3-8Y75] (“A report from
executive search firm Heidrick & Struggles found 28% of board seat appointments at Fortune 500
companies in 2016 went to women, down from 30% in 2015.”).
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measures, such as unionization, 267 and focused new scrutiny on other
practices, such as sexual harassment or qualification tests that had been
previously treated as routine workplace practices. In many cases, these
practices became harder to justify once subject to scrutiny that showed both
disparate impact on the basis of factors such as race and gender and the lack
of workplace justifications.
In today’s economy, courts have similarly viewed the shift toward
winner-take-all compensation systems and the negative-sum competitive
mindset in management and finance as routine and outside the appropriate
ambit of judicial scrutiny in antidiscrimination suits. So long as they do,
individual lawsuits like Ellen Pao’s cannot address the systemic factors that
underlie such cases; her case simply amounts to a claim that Kleiner Perkins
should welcome women with sharp elbows alongside the men. 268
This section looks at the ability of antidiscrimination law to address
systemic business practices that have discriminatory effects. First, it shows
how existing disparate treatment law is ill-suited to address the
interconnections between individual employee evaluations and the shift in
business cultures. Second, it considers the degree to which cases like the ones
against Microsoft—which use antidiscrimination law to challenge business
practices themselves—can be more effective.
This section concludes that where companies adopt competitive
evaluation schemes associated with increased executive compensation and
gender disparities, and where these systems do not correspond to evidence of
increased firm performance, such practices should be subject to greater
judicial scrutiny. The form that scrutiny takes would depend on the nature of
the individual case, but it would only fit into Title VII through an approach
that engages the substantive legitimacy of discriminatory business practices.
The conclusion suggests that the most effective approaches combine
antidiscrimination efforts with substantive reforms designed to address
systemic business practices that have discriminatory effects.
A.

The Limited Reach of Current Antidiscrimination Doctrine
Antidiscrimination scholars correctly observe that the law has failed to
keep up as workforces have changed from narrow portals of entry and
lockstep career ladders to easier entry into unskilled positions and more
subjective and individualized pathways to advancement. 269 As these theorists
267. See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 13–24 (2016) (documenting the
decline in union strength).
268. Nitasha Tiku, Five Uncomfortable Truths About the Ellen Pao Verdict, VERGE (Apr. 2,
2015),
http://www.theverge.com/2015/4/2/8328115/ellen-pao-kleiner-perkins-venture-capitalverdict [https://perma.cc/RB7L-G78R].
269. See, e.g., Green, supra note 42, at 91 (noting changes in the years after Title VII veered
away from the “well-defined, hierarchical, bureaucratic structures delineating clear paths for
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argue, proving that an employer has treated an individual employee unfairly
because of sex discrimination has become increasingly difficult. 270
Ellen Pao’s case provides an example of the limitations of Title VII as
a check on the determinations made within such a system when the case is
framed solely as one of unequal treatment of an individual woman in
accordance with the ordinary norms of a competitive workplace. 271 Her case
generated attention to the lack of women in venture capital firms, but Pao’s
lawsuit took the Kleiner Perkins evaluation system as a given and argued that
she was unfairly evaluated in accordance with it. This type of case poses
intrinsic limitations: such individual cases do not fundamentally challenge
the nature of the competition that underlies the system.
Some scholars argue that Title VII was never intended to deal with either
the type of evaluation system a firm uses or the business decisions made
under them.272 A principal part of Pao’s case, for example, involved the
firm’s decision not to sponsor her proposed investment in Twitter in 2007, at
the very beginning of the social media era. Kleiner Perkins showed interest
in Twitter only when a male employee proposed it in 2010, well after other
venture capital firms had gotten in on the early funding rounds. 273 But relying
on hindsight to show that a firm passed up what turned out to be an incredibly
lucrative investment because of gender bias is intrinsically difficult.
Moreover, disparate treatment is hard to prove without a comparator,
and exact comparators are hard to find in individual cases. The prima facie
case model for contemporary antidiscrimination law relies principally on
comparison evidence demonstrating that an employer treated a plaintiff less
favorably than a similar worker from a different group, because of a protected
characteristic.274 Among top level and professional jobs, there may simply be

advancement within institutions” that characterized workplaces at the beginning of the
antidiscrimination efforts); Sturm, supra note 18, at 469 (observing that “[e]xclusion increasingly
results not from an intentional effort formally to exclude, but rather as a byproduct of ongoing
interactions shaped by the structures of day-to-day decisionmaking and workplace relationships”).
270. Sturm, supra note 18, at 468–69; see also Selmi, supra note 73, at 780 (pointing out the
difficulty in remedying subtle forms of discrimination).
271. Indeed, the New York Times referred to Kleiner Perkins, one of Silicon Valley’s premier
venture capital firms, as “one of those clans where everyone is fighting for power and wealth.”
David Streitfeld, Kleiner Perkins Portrays Ellen Pao as Combative and Resentful in Sex Bias Trial,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/technology/kleiner-perkinsportrays-ellen-pao-as-combative-and-resentful-in-sex-bias-trial.html
[https://perma.cc/YBT35SHF].
272. Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 9 (discussing how “it may be difficult, if not impossible, for
a court to go back and reconstruct the numerous biased evaluations and perceptions that ultimately
resulted in an adverse employment decision”).
273. Tiku, supra note 268.
274. See Franklin, supra note 49, at 1317, 1367; Naomi Schoenbaum, The Case for Symmetry
in Antidiscrimination Law, 2017 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); supra text accompanying notes
61–72.
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no one else in a small unit. 275 Even among middle management positions
there may be no one who performs the same duties. 276 In an Equal Pay Act
case, a federal trial court observed that:
These are Senior Vice Presidents in charge of different aspects of
Defendant’s operations; these are not assembly-line workers or
customer-service representatives. In the case of such lower-level
workers, the goals of the Equal Pay Act can be accomplished due to
the fact that these types of workers perform commodity-like work and,
therefore, should be paid commodity-like salaries. However, the
practical realities of hiring and compensating high-level executives
deal a fatal blow to Equal Pay Act claims.277
Moreover, in today’s workplaces, routine duties have become
increasingly mechanized or outsourced, with the remaining employees
performing varied and discretionary tasks. 278
In Pao’s case, she complained that her compensation was low because
of her failure to be promoted, the way the firm allocated carried interest from
its investment fund, and the failure to fully compensate her for the value she
delivered.279 Kleiner Perkins responded that Pao was “treated better than her

275. See, e.g., Morgan v. Cty. Comm’n of Lawrence Cty., No. 5:14-CV-01823-CLS, 2016 WL
3525357, at *6 (N.D. Ala. June 20, 2016) (explaining that during the plaintiff’s career at an
emergency management agency, the “agency was staffed by three persons, holding the positions of
Director, Deputy Director, and TVA Planner”); S ALLY E. ANDERSON, SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
FOR SOLE AND SMALL F IRM PRACTITIONERS 1 http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/lpl/
downloads/soleandsmallfirm.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5N7-96WB] (“[N]early 80 percent of lawyers
in the United States currently practice in firms of [one to five lawyers].”).
276. See, e.g., Bilow v. Much Shelist Freed Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C., 277 F.3d
882, 894 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that instances identified by the plaintiff in which “male attorneys
seemingly received more assistance were cases that were either more complex, or were not
contingent fee cases, or took place in Chicago and therefore did not entail the same travel
expenses”); Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1032 n.7 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff was
unable to find an apt comparator because she had “not shown that any other associate—male or
female—who failed to conform with the firm’s professional standards, had ever been considered for
partnership”).
277. Georgen-Saad v. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., 195 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (W.D. Tex. 2002); see also
Keener v. Universal Cos., 128 F. Supp. 3d 902, 907–08 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (discussing the plaintiff’s
contention that as a shipping and receiving clerk, she was expected to perform some supervisory
duties without appropriate pay, but noting that the comparators identified by the plaintiff did not
perform comparable supervisory duties); Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 40 (quoting Georgen-Saad,
195 F. Supp. 2d at 857).
278. Goldberg, supra note 63, at 755–56 (describing the prevalence of assembly-line
workplaces in the manufacturing era in comparison with today’s more varied assignment of
responsibilities).
279. Complaint for Damages at 8, Pao v. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers LLC, No. CGC-12520719 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 10, 2012) [hereinafter Pao Complaint].
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alleged male peers and was, in fact, paid more during key periods at issue.” 280
Pao’s allegations, however, ultimately depended on, not a snapshot of
compensation with male peers at a particular point in time, but rather on the
cumulative effect of a series of subjective decisions.
In addition, while stereotyping goes to the heart of Pao’s claims, the way
the law on gender-stereotyping discrimination has developed makes claims
of unconscious, subjective, or cumulative bias difficult to prove. 281 In the
original U.S. Supreme Court case on stereotyping, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,282 the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was a candidate for partnership at an
accounting giant, and she had an outstanding record of obtaining major
contracts.283 In denying her partnership, the partners’ criticism of her
included that she cursed, could use a “course at charm school,” and that if
she wanted to make partner at a later time, she should “walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry.”284 The Supreme Court observed that “it takes no
special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive
female employee as requiring ‘a course in charm school.’”285 The Court
distinguished language that it deemed gender stereotyping—terms like
“macho” and “masculine”—from language it perceived as gender neutral, but
unfavorable—such as “overly aggressive” and “unduly harsh.”286
Yet, since 1989, employers have become more adept at avoiding
references to “charm school” and other explicitly gendered comments.287
Instead, sex stereotyping more typically involves unconscious biases that
may “sneak up” on a decision-maker. Biases “affect perceptions and
evaluations of an employee in i[n]numerable encounters that occur well
280. Trial Brief of Def. Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers LLC at 10, Pao v. Kleiner Perkins
Caufield & Byers LLC, No. CGC-12-520719 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Kleiner
Perkins Trial Brief].
281. See Charlotte S. Alexander et al., Post-Racial Hydraulics: The Hidden Dangers of the
Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 43 (2016) (“[B]ecause most Americans embrace equality
ideals, they discriminate in subtle, obfuscated, and sometimes unconscious ways . . . .”); Sturm,
supra note 18, at 460 (“Cognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of interaction
have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued inequality.”).
282. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
283. Id. at 233–34.
284. Id. at 235.
285. Id. at 256.
286. Id. at 235.
287. In the Pao case, formal performance reviews did not contain such language, but testimony
at trial indicated that one partner told an investigator that Pao had a “female chip on her shoulder,”
while another partner said “women should not be invited to a dinner with former Vice President
Al Gore because they ‘kill the buzz’”; another partner “joked to a junior partner that she should be
‘flattered’ that a colleague showed up at her hotel room door wearing only a bathrobe.” David
Streitfeld, Ellen Pao Loses Silicon Valley Bias Case Against Kleiner Perkins, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/technology/ellen-pao-kleiner-perkins-case-decision
.html [https://perma.cc/LXQ3-Z9BJ].
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before any discrete moment of work-assignment, promotion, or
discharge . . . . By the time the manager actually makes such a decision, the
die may have already been cast by the earlier biased perceptions.”288
Pao’s claims follow the classic scenario: she alleged that the firm
discriminated against her through a series of actions that had a cumulative
effect,289 while the jurors ultimately held against her the fact that her
performance reviews deteriorated over time such that her termination came
as the end result of a long period of difficulties.290
Kleiner Perkins effectively used those evaluations against Pao because
they established that she had been on notice of the firm’s concerns about her
performance and failed to make the necessary adjustments. 291 The
evaluations referred to “pushing too hard to establish herself, instead of being
collaborative,”292 being too territorial and untrustworthy, pursuing her own
agenda, and not being “a team player.”293 A central part of Pao’s response,
however, was that such behavior was typical of male employees and that the
perception that she was not a team player resulted in part from her complaints
about the firm’s hostile atmosphere for women. Indeed, one of the jurors most
favorable to Pao, who believed that she had been the victim of discrimination,
commented that the male junior partners at Kleiner “had those same character
flaws that Ellen was cited with,” but they were promoted anyway. 294 In short,
Pao’s claim was that she could not get away with the same self-interested,
competitive behavior as the men.
Competitive workplaces intrinsically involve a balance between selfpromotion that benefits the company (how many top clients did Pao land?)
and competitive characteristics that alienate others (Pao’s purported “sharp
elbows”). Indeed, Liar’s Poker described investment banking houses as
celebrating traders’ ability to manipulate others and get away with it. 295 Pao’s
claim, presented as an individual case, amounted to an assertion that Kleiner
Perkins got the balance wrong. Yet, her case attracted attention because it
symbolized the limited presence of women in the venture-capital world. In
the context of such a case, Pao, who very much wanted to be in that world,
288. Bagenstos, supra note 18, at 8.
289. Pao’s allegations included the exclusion of women from important meetings, the failure to
give her credit for work she had done, the failure to sponsor projects she proposed, and other actions
that limited her ability to demonstrate her value to the firm. See Pao Complaint, supra note 279, at
9, 12.
290. Streitfeld, supra note 287.
291. Streitfeld, supra note 271.
292. Kleiner Perkins Trial Brief, supra note 280, at 3.
293. Id. at 6.
294. Streitfeld, supra note 271.
295. See LEWIS, supra note 146, at 215–17 (describing how Michael Lewis “completely
reassessed corporate America” in part by exploiting the fact that insider-trading laws applied only
to stocks and not bonds).
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could not truly represent the women who never applied because they found
the entire environment hostile. Nor could Pao present what may well be the
most compelling claim against such a system—that the system itself is
intrinsically flawed. The next section will explain how antidiscrimination
cases can combine challenges to the legitimacy of competitive management
systems with claims of disparate gender impact and how they can enhance
the impact of antidiscrimination law in the process.
B.

Antidiscrimination Law and a Structural Equality Approach

As we discussed above, Congress initially adopted Title VII to eliminate
discriminatory employment practices based on a structural analysis that
identified segregated workplaces not only as a source of racial and gender
inequality, but also as an impediment to economic growth.
Antidiscrimination law has stalled in the new era because it is not tied to a
comparable structural analysis of the new sources of inequality and a
commitment to evaluate them on their own terms. Consequently,
antidiscrimination law has been unable to address the promotion processes
that determine the benefits of the new economy.
This section argues that reaching these gendered business practices
requires a new approach: substantively engaging the propriety of those
practices and linking them to counterproductive workplace practices and
gender disparities. The immediate impact of doing so sets up disparate impact
cases like the one against Microsoft. But the longer term effect of such an
approach, as with the delegitimization of segregated workplaces, may be
greater judicial willingness to extend existing legal doctrines to reach such
practices.
This section frames the analysis of how to move forward by parsing the
elements of disparate impact—first, showing the disparate impact associated
with certain business practices. Then, in anticipation of a corporation’s
defense, this section demonstrates that these practices cannot be justified by
business necessity, especially given the wealth of business literature showing
that those practices have detrimental effects on companies and their
employees. As for the third element of a disparate impact case, this section
shows that less discriminatory alternatives exist, and they are ones that
comparably serve employers’ purposes.
To prove a disparate impact claim, plaintiffs must show that an
employer uses a particular employment practice that has an adverse impact
on women.296 Courts have adopted the EEOC test for what constitutes a

296. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 658 (1989) (considering disparate impact in the context of racial discrimination);
Sandra F. Sperino, Justice Kennedy’s Big New Idea, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1789, 1795–96 (2016)
(providing the elements of a disparate impact claim).
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“sufficiently substantial” disparity:297 when the selection rate for one group
is less than 80% of the selection rate for another group. 298 While the employer
may argue that the statistical analysis must trace to the specific employment
practice, plaintiffs can use bottom-line statistics—the end results of hiring or
promotional practices—if “the elements of a respondent’s decision-making
process are not capable of separation for analysis . . . .” 299 Once the plaintiff
shows disparate impact, the employer can satisfy its burden by showing a
business necessity, “an overriding legitimate, non-[gender-based] business
purpose.” 300 Plaintiffs can still succeed if they prove that the employer could
have adopted alternative practices that would comparably serve the
employer’s purposes without resulting in the same gender disparities. 301
The conventional practices challenged in disparate impact litigation
include height and weight requirements, background checks, and pencil-andpaper tests.302 Importantly, there is no legal requirement that disparate impact
analysis apply only to formal or written policies; a subjective form of
assessment can be considered a particular employment practice. 303 Yet, until
this Article, completely missing from the discrimination literature is whether
the traits that form the basis for selection can themselves be the basis for
disparate impact litigation.
The competitive promotional practices we are discussing have been
under the radar simply because they look like background business decisions.
In an early comparable-worth case brought as a disparate impact claim,
American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
(AFSCME) v. Washington,304 the plaintiffs had difficulty challenging an
entire state-selected system of compensation based on market structure. 305
297. See Elliot Ko, Note, Big Enough to Matter: Whether Statistical Significance or Practical
Significance Should Be the Test for Title VII Disparate Impact Claims, 101 MINN. L. REV. 869, 871
(2016) (discussing this test).
298. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2010).
299. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
300. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 989 (5th
Cir. 1969). This is the paradigmatic statement of a business necessity. See Selmi, supra note 73, at
711 (noting that “the business necessity language entered the [discrimination] analysis” in
Papermakers).
301. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); Sperino, supra note 296, at 1796.
302. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 443 U.S. 321, 324 (1977) (addressing the disparate impact
of height and weight requirements); EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 465 (4th Cir. 2015)
(discussing the disparate impact caused when the employer required job applicants to submit to
background checks); Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 201–02 (2d Cir. 2011)
(discussing alleged disparities created by the weighting of oral and written portions of an exam).
303. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
304. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
305. Id. at 1406 (“A compensation system that is responsive to supply and demand and other
market forces is not the type of specific, clearly delineated employment policy contemplated by
Dothard and Griggs; such a compensation system . . . does not constitute a single practice that
suffices to support a claim under disparate impact theory.”).
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Yet, challenging forced-competition and artificial-stacking practices is
different from assailing market structures. 306 Within companies, managers
are making intentional decisions to implement appraisal systems that value
competition and that have a disparate impact on women. 307
Seniors have filed and settled several class action lawsuits against major
corporations, such as Ford and Goodyear, arguing that forced-ranking
systems were simply disguises for purposeful age-based discrimination. 308 In
the case against Ford, the plaintiffs showed that older workers were so
disproportionately placed in the lowest category that Ford faced an “almost
impossible” burden in showing “that the forced ranking was job-related and
consistent with business necessity.”309
The systems of negative-sum competition, such as stack ranking or
rank-and-yank, can be shown to have a disparate impact on vulnerable
groups.310 In a Monte Carlo style simulation study with organizations of
various sizes, researchers determined that a forced-ranking system selecting
for termination would have racially disparate effects. In a small organization,
if 10% of the workforce was laid off, the chance of a disparate impact
violation would be 5.1%, “and this increases to an 11.8% likelihood of an
[adverse impact] flag when 15% of the workforce is laid off.” 311 In addition,
a forced-ranking system insulates subjective reasons for an assessment
behind the cloak of a numerical value, and the system itself may be used
when there is an insufficient number of employees to make a curving process
valid.312 While few comprehensive studies have been undertaken, evidence
is emerging that rank-and-yank methods have gendered effects. For example,
a 2016 study showed that the largest factor correlating with gaps in women’s

306. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to
Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. S T. L.J. 951, 951–52 (2011) (describing how the market has
transformed into a business defense for paying women less).
307. See, e.g., Elvira & Graham, supra note 189, at 601 (finding that bonus-pay systems
produce more gender disparities than systems that give greater weight to base pay).
308. See, e.g., Write Them Up and Get Them Out: Age Discrimination Through Forced Ranking
Systems, 2 ANN. 2004 ATLA–CLE 1794 (July 2004) (addressing corporate forced-ranking
systems).
309. Tom Osborne & Laurie A. McCann, Forced Ranking and Age-Related Employment
Discrimination, HUM. RTS., Spring 2004, at 6, 7 http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol31_2004/spring2004/hr_spring04_forced.html
[https://perma.cc/QCQ6-Z373].
310. Gary W. Giumetti et al., Forced Distribution Rating Systems: When Does “Rank and
Yank” Lead to Adverse Impact?, 100 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 180, 180, 190 (2015) (implying that
diverse organizations would benefit from avoiding pure forced-distribution rating systems).
311. Id. at 188.
312. See John Edward Davidson, Note, The Temptation of Performance Appraisal Abuse in
Employment Litigation, 81 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1611, 1613 (1995) (“No one asks, and the appraiser
does not say, how or why she rated a particular employee’s performance in a particular manner.”).
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duration of work in the information–technology industry was whether a firm
used rank-and-yank methods.313
If employers seek to justify such systems as a business necessity, they
should find it difficult. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 puts the burden of proof
on the employer to establish this defense by showing that the challenged
practice is job-related and “consistent with business necessity.”314 In the
original disparate impact case of Griggs v. Duke Power,315 for example, the
Supreme Court held that the requirement of a high school diploma was not
“significantly related to successful job performance” for blue-collar workers
at a power-generating facility. 316 The EEOC has recently developed a new
guidance to more strongly interrogate blanket refusals to hire people with any
criminal background. 317
By contrast, negative-sum management strategies have been treated as
neutral. When female and African-American plaintiffs in a 2001 case against
Microsoft, Donaldson v. Microsoft,318 challenged its forced ranking system,
the court denied class certification, finding that the results of an
individualized rating system meant that the class claims were not common. 319
The court also dismissed the disparate impact claims in that suit, finding an
absence of statistical evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ theories. In this
earlier Microsoft case, the plaintiffs simply were not able to show disparities
in compensation or promotion decisions regarding putative class members. 320
Yet, in part, the court prevented that demonstration by accepting Microsoft’s
313. Shuo Yan & Chunmian Ge, Gender Differences in Competition Preference and Work
Duration in the IT Industry: LinkedIn Evidence 9 (2016) (unpublished research) (presented at the
Thirty-Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016),
http://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1361&context=icis2016 [https://perma.cc/9H9SX4MU] (“[C]hanges of level of competition in the workplace will change the gender gap in the
work duration. The removing of ‘rank and yank’ system, which is a highly competitive performance
appraisal system, increases female employees’ work duration in the IT industry.”).
314. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
315. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
316. Id. at 426.
317. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF
ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE C IVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3 (2012) http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9XZ4-HUWX] (“The Commission intends this document for use by employers
considering the use of criminal records in their selection and retention processes; by individuals
who suspect that they have been denied jobs . . . because of their criminal records.”); see, e.g., Press
Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Pepsi to Pay $3.13 Million and Made Major
Policy Changes to Resolve EEOC Finding of Nationwide Hiring Discrimination Against African
Americans (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-11-12a.cfm
[https://perma.cc/B5LZ8FFG] (“[T]he EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that the criminal
background check policy formerly used by Pepsi discriminated against African Americans in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”).
318. 205 F.R.D. 558 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
319. Id. at 568.
320. Id. at 567.

CAHN.TOP RINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

482

2/6/2018 10:50 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 96:425

claim that its assessment system was a “meritocracy” akin to a grading
curve,321 and denying the plaintiffs the ability to aggregate their numbers in
a class action to supply precisely the proof that the court said was missing. It
does not appear that the Donaldson plaintiffs challenged the competition
itself as a gendered metric of evaluation.
Almost fifteen years later, in Moussouris v. Microsoft,322 the court was
initially dismissive of similar claims, holding that the plaintiffs did not
explain why a forced curve would systematically undervalue women in the
tech professions.323 Yet, the court allowed the case to proceed after the
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint targeting the stack ranking system
Microsoft used between 2011 and 2013 as an invalid performance instrument
that has gendered effects. 324 The amended pleading pointed out that 80% of
the managers who were calibrating their employees’ performance were
men—while only 17% of the tech employees whose performances were
being rated were women—and also detailed the system’s gender-based pay
and promotion effects.325 In October of 2016, the court denied Microsoft’s
second motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs had identified a specific
employment practice—the stack ranking system—that had a disparate impact
on female tech workers. 326
The typical employer response to such a claim is that the system can be
justified as a “business necessity.” 327 The Microsoft environment, however,
does not seem conducive to improving economic performance. 328 Indeed,

321. Id. at 562, 566:
The bi-annual evaluations are conducted on a bell curve, with personnel in similar jobs
competing against one another for “grades.” However, the subjectivity inherent in such
a review process is tempered by a requirement that employee goals and objectives be
mapped out well in advance, in order to allow the employee the opportunity to meet
articulated job expectations.
322. No. 2:15-CV-01483, 2016 WL 4472930 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 2016).
323. Id. at *9.
324. Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 5–6, Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No.
2:15-CV-01483 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 6, 2016) (“The stack ranking process forces a distribution of
performance ratings outcomes (from 1 through 5) regardless of whether there are meaningful
performance differences between individual employees within a particular peer group.”).
325. Id. at 7.
326. Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No. C15-1483JLR, 2016 WL 4472930, at *13 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 14, 2016).
327. See Christina O’Connell, Ban the Box: A Call to the Federal Government to Recognize a
New Form of Employment Discrimination, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801, 2811–12 (2015) (noting that
courts have expanded what qualifies as a “business necessity” to satisfy the defense, making it easier
for employers to defeat discrimination claims).
328. Examinations of Microsoft, e.g., found behavior similar to what Charness et al., supra note
255, found in the lab, with one employee acknowledging that:
“The behavior this engenders, people do everything they can to stay out of the bottom
bucket,” one Microsoft engineer said. “People responsible for features will openly
sabotage other people’s efforts. One of the most valuable things I learned was to give

CAHN.TOP RINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

2/6/2018 10:50 PM

Gender & the Tournament

483

Vanity Fair, commenting on Microsoft’s use of the system challenged in the
litigation described above, observed that: “Potential market-busting
businesses—such as e-book and smartphone technology—were killed,
derailed, or delayed amid bickering and power plays.”329
As the management literature indicates, these ultracompetitive
management systems are bad business practices. 330 And even where these
practices may have some effectiveness in selecting lower performing workers
for termination in the first year or two, the reliability and validity effects
diminish very sharply over time. 331 Moreover, investors and shareholders are
beginning to understand the shortcomings of negative-sum competitions,
which are often tied to short-term measures of business performance. 332 Larry
Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest global investment
management company, wrote a letter to the CEOs of other leading companies
urging a move-away from practices that have led to the maximization of
short-term profits at the expense of the long-term health of businesses. 333 And
studies repeatedly show that employers can adopt a less discriminatory
alternative that could achieve their purposes. 334 Management experts have
identified numerous alternative systems that could serve employer goals of
effective employee performance in a comparably effective manner to the
challenged practices. For example, employers could set achievement goals
and role-specific strategies, provide more immediate feedback—both
positive and negative—to enhance project performance, and create action
plans rather than move to immediate termination. 335 In short, management

the appearance of being courteous while withholding just enough information from
colleagues to ensure they didn’t get ahead of me on the rankings.”
Kurt Eichenwald, Microsoft’s Lost Decade, VANITY F AIR (Aug. 2012), http://www.vanityfair
.com/news/business/2012/08/microsoft-lost-mojo-steve-ballmer [https://perma.cc/84CK-S9UD].
329. Id.
330. For example, Development Dimensions International, Inc. “found that only 39 percent of
companies using forced ranking systems found them even moderately effective.” Tom Osborn &
Laurie McCann, Forced Ranking and Age-Related Employment Discrimination, HUM. RTS., Spring
2004, at 6, 10; see also Rapoport, supra note 252, at 44 n.2 (“Want people to turn on their colleagues
rather than encourage teamwork? Use a ‘rank and yank’ system that routinely drops the bottom 10%
of high achievers off the payroll.”).
331. Steven E. Scullen et al., Forced Distribution Rating Systems and the Improvement of
Workforce Potential: A Baseline Simulation, 58 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 1, 20 (2005) (“Annual
improvement averaged approximately 16% for the first 2 years, but fell quickly to about 2% in year
6 and 1% in year 10. After year 20, there was no improvement.”).
332. Indeed, rank-and-yank has often been associated with business abuses, including Jack
Welch’s earnings management system and Enron. See MARTIN, supra note 135, at 29, 97.
333. Matt Turner, Here Is the Letter the World’s Largest Investor, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink,
Just Sent to CEOs Everywhere, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.businessinsider
.com/blackrock-ceo-larry-fink-letter-to-sp-500-ceos-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/A35X-A78H].
334. See infra notes 335–36 (discussing less discriminatory alternative business practices).
335. Pawan Alamchandani, Forced Ranking Performance Appraisal Method: Is It Really
Required?, HR.COM (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.hr.com/en/magazines/all_articles/forced-ranking-
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practices that are associated with gender disparities are also bad for business,
and consequently, they are (or should be336) indefensible under Title VII.
***
Disparate impact theory has been limited in its effectiveness for the
reasons indicated in Part I. That is, lawsuits have been effective when tied to
a determination to root out a discredited practice and ineffective when they
seek to extend Title VII without a substantive analysis that links particular
practices not just to disparate impact per se but to systemic practices that
deserve scrutiny.337
A victory for the Microsoft plaintiffs is therefore likely to encourage
technical evasions. It is difficult to obtain statistical evidence necessary to
prove a disparate impact violation, and companies can ensure that rank-andyank evaluations do not cross the disparate impact threshold. 338 Alternatively,
employers can eliminate the “yank” part of rank-and-yank while otherwise
keeping competitive rankings. While courts should find it difficult to hold
that a discredited practice meets the business necessity defense, defendants
can, nonetheless, more easily defend a newly reconfigured practice that lacks,
at least for the time being, the same degree of notoriety or established
negative effects.339 Nonetheless, this Article suggests that business practices
that emphasize destructive competition over collaboration (or other forms of
competition)—especially when they influence recruitment practices,
evaluation and promotion measures, or termination procedures—can be
expected to produce similar gender disparities, and like rank-and-yank, they
too should be illegal absent a demonstration of business necessity. Of course,
simply emphasizing competition does not always produce such disparities

performance-appraisal-method-is-it-_hr26wbz9.html
[https://perma.cc/8NQ6-9F99];
Coren
Apicella & Johanna Mollerstrom, Women Do Like to Compete—Against Themselves, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/opinion/sunday/women-do-like-to-compete
-against-themselves.html [https://perma.cc/48ZV-39F8].
336. Michael Selmi makes the important point that the nature of discrimination has changed,
and courts tend to defer to employer justifications, particularly when it comes to routine business
practices, even though competitive evaluation systems appear to be discriminatory. Michael Selmi,
The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social
Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 947 (2015) (noting that courts give deference to employers by
reasoning that they are most competent in determining how to best restructure their business
practices). This Article builds on those insights by arguing, in contrast, that substantive engagement
with counterproductive business practices that produce gender disparities can—and should—be
found illegal.
337. Selmi, supra note 73, at 705–06.
338. Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63
FLA. L. REV. 251, 257 (2011) (“It is today very rare for plaintiffs other than highly sophisticated
and well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, to prevail under Title VII on a
disparate impact theory.”).
339. See O’Connell, supra note 327, at 2811–12 (noting that defendants can more easily meet
the business necessity defense when they do not consider applicants as unique individuals but
instead institute general hiring policies).
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nor is it always unjustified. 340 It is the illegitimacy of the underlying practice,
coupled with the statistically disparate gender effects, that creates the
systemic challenge.
For the approach suggested in this Article to be effective, it requires not
just focus on rank-and-yank, but a broader inquiry into the sources of greater
inequality. A true structural analysis must simultaneously engage gender
disparities and economic inequality. Consequently, this transformative use of
antidiscrimination law is not just an extension of existing law—it is
fundamentally different in conception from earlier assumptions about
Title VII. The analysis goes to the heart of what are, at once, metrics that
produce gender inequalities and that are also indefensible as appropriate
business practices. Indeed, at times, innovations in governing law prompt
social and educational changes much larger than their doctrinal effects. 341
Regardless of whether disparate impact claims succeed in any individual
case, they provide a basis for reviving the vision of antidiscrimination law as
promoting equality both within and outside of the workplace and as
challenging prohibited classifications and systemic economic inequality.
Conclusion
The management revolution that greatly increased executive
compensation and contributed to the financialization of American business
has also produced worsening societal inequality—and dramatically
exacerbated gender disparities at the top of the American income ladder. The
creation of these disparities has been the subject of increasing criticism.342
New studies demonstrate that companies that have adopted the more
competitive and share-focused corporate culture have performed worse than
the supposedly bureaucratic business entities of midcentury America.343

340. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 12, at 558 (“Of course, some businesses—used car dealerships,
hedge funds—may want to attract selfish opportunists, because employees perform tasks that are
relatively simple, the desired outcome is certain, and employee performance is easy to
observe . . . .”).
341. See Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace
Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1283 (2011) (“Sexual harassment law has changed cultural norms
and eliminated many forms of egregious workplace behavior.”); Selmi, supra note 73, at 781
(concluding that social support is necessary for the expansion of antidiscrimination doctrine).
342. See, e.g., Lazonick, supra note 145, at 858 (“As the U.S. economy struggles to recover
from the Great Recession, the erosion of middle-class jobs and the explosion of income inequality
have endured long enough to raise serious questions about whether the U.S. economy is beset by
deep structural problems.”).
343. See Stout, supra note 12, at 534–35, 558 (maintaining that “experts who have surveyed
the empirical literature . . . conclude that it provides little or no support for the claim that incentive
plans reliably contribute to better corporate performance” and has performed worse than the
managerial era in generating returns for investors). In addition, “incentive pay has been statistically
linked with opportunistic, unethical, and even illegal executive behavior, including earning
manipulations, accounting frauds, and excessive risk-taking.” Id. at 534.
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Once these practices take hold, they do not stop with slowing growth or
counterproductive business models. They also have reinforcing sets of effects
on who gains power, how they conduct business, and the consequences for
society a whole. As this Article demonstrates, the focus on outsized money
and power attracts a select few. These environments encourage competitive
practices that favor men over women.
The absence of women in top management, the financial sector, and
elsewhere thus serves as a symptom of something more than just the failure
of individual women to ascend to the higher paying positions in American
society. It is also a symptom of a much more deeply unequal society that
affects numerous other groups. After all, the survival-of-the-fittest culture
that produced gender disparities at Microsoft, also contributed to the scandals
at Enron.344 And numerous studies find that large salaries and concentration
of power breed overconfidence, egotism, hubris, and arrogance. 345
These factors then touch off a series of consequences with reinforcing
effects. The top corporations focus more on earnings reports than investment
in new plants, research, or employees. Companies often slash training
programs or move operations overseas, even when doing so produces a loss
of otherwise needed expertise and the destruction of well-paying middleclass jobs in the United States. 346 Retail companies like Wal-Mart experience
pressure to pay their employees little unless forced by a tighter labor market
to go beyond these rock-bottom salaries. The same forces contribute to
greater corporate and economic instability because the search for the next
unicorn encourages often unjustified risk-taking. For example, the incentives
to play accounting games decrease the reliability and transparency of
American business practices. 347
It is not a solution to simply add women to the upper echelons of
corporations without changing the backdrop template of evaluation. Ellen
Pao’s claim, after all, is that her self-interested behavior should have been
tolerated alongside the men’s. And Carly Fiorina became CEO at HewlettPackard in large part because she had previously been CEO of a smaller
company (Lucent Technologies), the stock of which had soared because of

344. See, e.g., Lynn Brewer, Is There a Little Bit of Enron in All of Us?, J. QUALITY &
PARTICIPATION, Spring 2007, at 26, 28 (“Just prior to the review process in April and May, both in
2000 and 2001, [whistle-blowing] reports dropped significantly, and then began to rise again
dramatically in June right after reviews were completed.” Brewer then notes that “[t]his would
suggest that, at least for a time, employees were silenced out of fear—until they realized what an
injustice had occurred. Eventually, the more employees were rewarded for the unethical behavior
generated for the company, the more the behavior became acceptable.”).
345. Paredes, supra note 128, at 675, 717–18.
346. See Lazonick, supra note 145, at 858 (“From the early 2000s, globalization, characterized
by the movement of employment offshore, left all members of the U.S. labor force, even those with
advanced educational credentials and substantial work experience, vulnerable to displacement.”).
347. See Black & Carbone, supra note 117, at 380, 390 n.103, 396–97.
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“creative accounting and liberal financing of sales to customers.”348 Instead,
the failure to include women in upper management should be seen as a sign
that management tolerates the types of environments that contribute to
greater inequality, instability, and efforts to rig the game. 349
The ultimate reform of the system will require not only inclusion of
women, but also greater efforts to include pro-social and institution- (rather
than self-) promoting qualities. 350 These qualities include attention to
employee morale, creation of collaborative work environments that make
employee contributions more than the sum of their parts,351 longer term
horizons, and reciprocal notions of loyalty that tie employers and employees
closer together.
Antidiscrimination efforts, which once assumed a more level playing
field for white men, were designed to ensure women and minorities access to
the “good” jobs in the economy. Today, antidiscrimination efforts that target
competitive evaluation systems that discriminate could play a dual role. They
could help to ensure fairer systems for everyone. They could also become a
vehicle for identifying the counterproductive practices that have made the
corporate tournament a zero-sum enterprise.
The doctrinal proposal we make here is intended to reverse the
foreground and background of workplace decisions. For too long,
antidiscrimination lawsuits have focused on individual instances of unequal
treatment that have taken place against a backdrop of negative-sum
workplace competitions where merit is measured by short-term successes in
intensely competitive environments. One example of this is the stacked
ranking system challenged in Moussouris for its gendered effects. Our project
is broader—we hope to encourage courts to embrace a commitment to
equality that will inform the interpretation of antidiscrimination law in ways
that can withstand the coming era of a conservative Supreme Court.

348. KHURANA, supra note 140, at 109.
349. See SCANDALOUS ECONOMICS, supra note 19, at 26 (“[I]n the United States women
accounted for only about 18 percent of corporate officers in the finance and insurance industries in
2008, and for 7.3 percent of chief financial officers in Fortune 500 companies.” (citations omitted));
June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Unequal Terms: Gender, Power, and the Recreation of Hierarchy,
69 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 189, 197, 208 (2016) (“In 2012, women held only a
little over 14% of the executive officer positions in Fortune 500 companies, and more than 25% of
these companies had no female executive officers.” (footnote omitted)).
350. See Eagly, supra note 259, at 8–9 (indicating that transformational leadership styles
associated with women may also work better for men).
351. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 12, at 560 (“Experimental tests of compensation arrangements
that rely on employee trust and employer trustworthiness . . . show that they can be more effective
than ex ante incentive contracts at inducing employee effort in repeated interactions.”); Eagly, supra
note 259, at 8 (“There are . . . multiple indications that women, compared with men, enact their
leader roles with a view to producing outcomes that can be described as more compassionate,
benevolent, universalistic, and ethical, thus promoting the public good.”).
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Antidiscrimination law historically had two components: a moral one—
discrimination is wrong—and a structural one that sought to promote equality
for workers collectively through efforts to keep in place the factors
supporting good jobs. The legal and economic infrastructure of good jobs that
characterized the mid-twentieth century is gone. For antidiscrimination law
to serve its original purposes, society must once again create a way for
equality efforts and antidiscrimination law to operate in tandem. This Article
offers a beginning to that effort.

